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ABSTRACT 
The knowledge of one's culture is critical for success in statecraft and strategy. 
Yet, perhaps because it is so pervasive, the influence of one's own culture on strategy, 
defense preparation, and the conduct of war tends to escape notice. The influence of 
American culture on strategy, however, does not escape the notice of America's potential 
enemies. This thesis explores the American approach to strategy from a cultural 
perspective. It examines characteristics of American culture and the cultures of the four 
U.S. military services, which influence the U.S. strategy-making process. It explains how 
these characteristics formed and how they might influence American strategy. Unlike 
traditional explanations of the U.S. military cultures, such as Carl Builder's The Masks of 
War, this analysis ex~ines the services' cultures from a more operational perspective. 
This thesis emphasizes the role the services' respective operating environments play in 
shaping their divergent perspectives on strategy,joint command structures, and doctrine. 
Cultural self-knowledge allows American strategists to recognize when aspects of 
American culture and the cultures of the services may make some strategies possible, 
desirable, or unimaginjible. It allows American strategists to recognize when political 
leaders' goals and the services' strategies may be poorly matched. 
v 
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Strategy is not made in purely rational terms. Rationality is inherently conditioned 
by one's culture. Culture consists of a set of general and ordered beliefs, attitudes, and 
assumptions that establish pervasive and long-standing preferences. Culture is a 
sociologically based, ideational framework that either presents decision-makers with a 
limited range of options or acts as a lens that alters the appearance and efficacy of 
different choices. These cultures shape perceptions and affect what individuals notice and 
how they interpret it. It screens out some parts of reality while magnifying others. 
Because it imposes a degree of restraint on behavior, culture may make it difficult for 
states and militaries to develop sensible and realistic approaches to the strategic problems 
that confront them. 
This thesis explores the Americ"an approach to strategy from a c~ltural 
perspective. It examines characteristics of American culture and the cultures of the four 
U.S. military services. It argues that cultural self-knowledge is critical for success in 
statecraft and strategy. Perhaps because it is so pervasive, the influence of one's own 
culture on strategy, defense preparation, and the conduct of war tend to escape notice. 
The influence of American culture on strategy, however, does not escape the notice of 
America's potential enemies. Strategists who fail to question their assumptions cannot be 
expected to expose strategic vulnerabilities. A strategist lacking cultural self-knowledge is 
likely to recommend strategies that may not be plausibly attained through socially 
Xl 
acceptable means and methods. Because strategy is the relating of military power to 
political objectives, however, strategists cannot focus solely on their society's culture. 
The cultures of a nation's military organizations are important because they have 
a pervasive impact on state behavior. Their long-standing preferences in strategies and 
weapons systems inherently limit the options of the political leaders. The rationality of 
the President's uniformed advisors is conditioned by their respective service cultures. A 
strategist who is unable to understand the sources of ideas that undergirds the national 
military organizations' deeply-rooted preferences in strategies may not recognize 
occasions when political leaders' goals and services' strategies may be poorly matched. A 
strategist lacking knowledge of the services' cultures will have a difficult time recognizing 
when culture make some undertakings possible, desirable, or unimaginable. 
America's experiences during the seventeenth and· eighteenth centuries shaped at 
least seven characteristics of American culture that influence the U.S. strategy-making 
process. Marked by physical and political survival during brutal wars, revolution, and 
national independence, this formative period saw the rise of cultural beliefs such as (a) the 
virtuous will ultimately triumph, (b) wars are to be brought to a successful and absolute 
conclusion, and (c) the United States is destined as the "city on the hill" providing a 
beacon of liberal democracy 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the formation of at least eight 
characteristics of American culture. Characteristics such as Americans' highly.technical, 
mechanical, and direct approach to war and strategy, inability to view war and strategy in 
a holistic manner, and ignorance of the need for strategy were formed amidst industrial 
X11 
growth, technological change, the rise of the middle class and hortatory concepts such as 
nationalism and social Darwinism, and the preeminence of the United States. 
The United States is likely to perform more effectively in large-scale wars and in 
wars where absolute victories can be obtained. Planning and execution of a D-Day-style 
landing, of nuclear deterrence, an intricate Single Integrated Operational Plan (SlOP), or of 
a large-scale conventional war with redundant paths to victory all exploit America's 
strengths. The United States may have difficulties in operations such as those conducted 
in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia that require subtlety in statecraft and strategy. Success in 
these kinds of operations requires a level knowledge of culture, languages, and history that 
was conspicuously absent in Americans' efforts in Vietnam. Adopting a direct approach 
in operations other than war such as conflicts in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia may well 
prove ineffectual. These kinds of conflict in particular require Americans' to acknowledge 
that the most sophisticated information technology and precision-guided weapons may 




Cultural self-knowledge is critical for success in statecraft and strategy . Yet, 
perhaps because it is so pervasive, the influence of one's own culture on strategy, defense 
preparation, and the conduct of war tends to escape notice. U.S. strategic vulnerabilities 
will not escape the notice of those intent on becoming the next General Giap. American 
cultural tendencies towards technology as a military panacea is creating just such a . 
vulnerability in the notion of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) in information 
warfare (IW). 
Cultural anthropologists note that American culture is a preponderantly 
monochronic culture. It considers challenges one at a time, in isolation, pragmatically.1 
American defense debates reflect this tendency. Defense issues such as d~tente, nuclear 
deterrence, ICBM basing, SDI, competitive strategies emerge, are debated, and then are 
inexorably replaced as American intellectuals move on to conquer new conceptual 
challenges. To recognize the faddish nature of an information-war RMA is, however, not 
to dismiss the content of the debate as all style and no substance. Few argue that war is 
not affected by technological change. The notion of an American RMA in information 
warfare is popular because it conforms to Americans' yearnings for a technical marvel 
that would win wars in a decisive and quick manner with little loss of American life and 
1 Colin S. Gray, "RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategy," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 17 
(Autumn/Winter 1997-1998): 51. See Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1976). 
1 
with comparatively low cost. The battleship, the Norden bombsight, the atomic bomb, 
and now the information-led RMA epitomize the search for technical answers to strategic 
questions. Indeed, the concept of an RMA is itself highly ethnocentric. 
The premise of the RMA is that technology (and concomitant changes in 
organization and operational concepts) drives strategic history.2 Historians and defense 
analysts have used the RMA to explain the triumphant victories of Napoleon. Using this 
concept, they have (painfully) made the point that Nazi Germany's early victories were a 
result of one if not several RMAs. The paradigm can explain how improvements in the 
internal combustion engine, aircraft design, the exploitation of radio and radar made 
possible revolutionary advancements in tank warfare, carrier aviation, amphibious 
warfare, and strategic bombing. But how can the paradigm contribute to an understanding 
of Wellington's victories with a nonrevolutionary British Army? How can it provide an 
understanding of why Germany eventually lost? How can it explain why the RMAs of 
the interwar period also helped shape one of the greatest protracted wars of attrition in 
history? How can it begin to explain why a technologically advanced and industrial nation 
like the United States was ignominiously defeated in Vietnam? The RMA paradigm fails 
because war and strategy are holistic enterprises. 
War and strategy have a variety of dimensions such as ethics, society, geography, 
politics, political and military leadership, economics, logistics, training, operations, 
intelligence, and friction. Some, like technology and leadership, may be more important 
2 Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Military Affairs," in The Absolute 
Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, ed. T.V. Paul, Richard J. 
Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 111-113. 
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than others, but none can be taken for granted. Some, like technology, tend to change more 
than others, but that does not lesson the importance of elements such as culture that do 
not change, or change ever so slowly. Cultural yearnings towards technology obfuscates 
Americans' perspective on the totality of war and strategy. Such yearnings have 
engendered a narrow 10minian paradigm that comes perilously close to equating a theory 
of discrete destruction with a theory of success in war. As demonstrated in Vietnam, 
however, technological superiority may win battles but may not guarantee victory. As 
demonstrated in Vietnam, technical superiority risks overestimating one's own 
capabilities and underestimating the ability of one's opponents to see such vulnerabilities 
and short-circuit one's technological advantages. Americans' experiences in that war 
should have exposed the lack of a holistic approach to war and strategy. It should have 
demonstrated that military effectiveness may have little bearing on the outcome of the 
war. It should have institutionalized in the u.S. military an awareness of Americans' 
technological hubris. Unfortunately, it did neither of these. The assumption that the link 
between technology and military effectiveness an~ that conclusive strategic effect for 
victory is as self-evident as it is direct has survived the deaths of fifty-eight thousand 
Americans. Its resurgence since the Gulf War is indicative of the strength of this cultural 
tendency and its influence on American strategy. 
This thesis seeks answers to three questions: What characteristics of American 
culture and the cultures of the U.S. military services influence the U.S. strategy-making 
process? How did these characteristics form? How might they influence American 
strategy? These are relevant questions, for the resurgence of the sin of unfettered 
3 
technological hubris is indicative of the lack of self-knowledge among American 
strategists. As Sun Tzu advised, self-knowledge is critical for success in strategy.3 A 
strategist who fails to interrogate assumptions cannot be expected to expose strategic 
vulnerabilities such as Americans' reliance on technology and machines as solutions for 
the problems of war. A strategist lacking cultural self-knowledge is likely to recommend 
strategies that may not be plausibly attained through socially acceptable means and 
methods. A strategist lacking cultural self-knowledge cannot be expected to take 
advantage of characteristics that improve the nation's ability to wage war or develop 
strategy. Because strategy is the relating of military power to political objectives, 
however, strategists cannot focus solely on their society's culture. 
The cultures of a nation's military organizations are important because they have 
a pervasive impact on state behavior. Their long-standing·preferences in strategies and 
weapons systems inherently limit the options of the political leaders. The rationality of 
the President's uniformed advisors is conditioned by their respective service cultures. A 
strategist who is unable to understand the sources of ideas that undergird the nation's 
military organizations' deeply-rooted preferences in strategies may not recognize 
occasions when political leaders' goals and services' strategies may be poorly matched. A 
strategist lacking knowledge of the services' cultures will have a difficult time recognizing 
when culture makes some undertakings possible, desirable, or unimaginable. 
3 "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." Sun Tzu, 
The Art a/War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963),84. 
I 
4 
A strategist lacking cultural self-knowledge will not be able to understand that 
unquantifiable factors such as culture, history, and politics are as important in the 
calculus of war and strategy as those more quantifiable elements that serve the interests of 
those championing the latest fad. To be sure, self-knowledge is not a magic elixir. 
Complete cultural knowledge of oneself and of the enemy cannot guarantee victory any 
more than fielding advanced information systems. But strategists endowed with a sense of 
cultural self-knowledge already know that. 
B. CULTURE 
Strategy is not made in a vacuum in purely rational terms.4 Rationality is 
inherently conditioned by one's culture. Shaped by geopolitical, historical, economic, and 
other influences, culture consists of a set of general and ordered beliefs, attitudes, values, 
and assumptions that establish long-standing preferences. Culture is a sociologically (not 
genetically) based ideational framework that either presents decision-makers with a 
limited range of options or acts as a lens that alters the appearance and efficacy of 
different choices.s These cultures shape perceptions and affect what individuals notice 
and how they interpret it. It screens out,some parts of reality while magnifying others. 
To paraphrase Alexander George, culture influences how incoming information is 
assessed. It influences how the situation is defined. It shapes the identification and 
4 Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, "Introduction: On Strategy," in The Making of 
Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),3. 
5 For Clifford Geertz and other anthropologists, culture involves genetics as well as sociology. 
See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973),89. 
5 
evaluation of options as well as choice.6 Because it imposes a degree of restraint on 
behavior, culture may make it difficult for states and militaries to develop sensible and 
realistic approaches to the strategic problems that confront them. 
In theoretical terms, the relationship between culture and behavior is not one of 
extreme determinism. Many countries with accreted cultures have in modem times chosen 
not to behave according to their alleged tendencies. During the First World War, for 
example, Britain fielded a ,continental-sized army and waged anything but a limited war. In 
1947, the United States chose to join NATO and subsequently organized and maintained 
a balance of power system for fifty years. One cannot conclude, however, that culture 
will not have much effect on b~havior at all--culture has a significant behavioral effect. In 
a broad, societal sense, it influences the context in which policy and strategy choices are 
debated. It influences the decision-makers' ability to understand the range of options and 
to perceive which are more viable. Taking the realist edifice as a target, those belonging to 
one culture think and act differently than those of another when faced with similar 
circumstances and choices. The following anecdote by Victor Suvorov, a defector who 
commanded a Soviet Army motorized-rifle company during the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, illustrates how SovietlRussian culture shapes its military's behavior: 
When I lecture to Western officers on tactics in the Soviet Army, I often 
close my talk by putting a question to them-always the same one-in 
order to be sure that they have understood men correctly. The question is 
trivial and elementary. Three Soviet motor-rifle companies are on the move 
in the same sector. The first has come under mur<Jerous fire and its attack 
6 Alexander George, "The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making 
Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System," in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. 
Laurence S. Falkowski (Boulder; Colo.: Westview, 1979), 113. 
6 
has crumbled,. the second is advancing slowly, with heavy losses, the third 
has suffered an enemy counter-attack and, having lost all its command 
personnel, is retreating. The commander of the regiment to which these 
companies belong has three tank companies and three artillery batteries in 
reserve .... "You are to guess," I say, "what steps a Soviet regimental 
commander would take, not a Western one but a Soviet, a Soviet, a Soviet 
one." I have yet to receive the correct replyJ 
Those involved in the deadly business of war and strategy need an understanding 
that Americans' cultural sensitivities towards casualties make U.S. commanders believe 
that the Soviets will reinforce the first or the third company. They need to understand 
why, in this situation, there is only one answer: "From the platoon level to that of the 
Supreme Commander," Suvorov continued, "all would agree that there is only one 
possible solution: all three tank companies and all three artillery batteries must be used to 
strengthen the company which is moving ahead, however slowly."8 Strategists cannot 
assume that members of other cultures will act the same. The relationship between culture 
, and behavior applies to military organizations as well. Indeed, the relationship may be 
even more direct than that of nations. 
Since organizations with rapid turnover such as sororities and fraternities are able 
to maintain their cultures, it should not be surprising that military organizations, with 
their long-term membership and powerful assimilation mechanisms, develop strong and 
enduring cultures.9 The emphasis on ceremony and tradition and the development of a 
7 Victor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, forward by General Sir John Hackett (New York: 
Macmillan, 1982), vii-viii. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 28. 
7 
common language and esprit de corps testify to the strength of a service's culture. 
Militaries do not hire people with outside experience. Those desiring to be part of a 
military organization must first pass the organization's selection process. They are then 
trained and educated by the same organization during which the novitiates begin to absorb 
the service's values and beliefs. Service members subsequently spend the majority of their 
careers in the s'ame organization. Members who are more willing to conform to the 
prevailing standards of their superiors tend to be rewarded with continued promotion. 
Those who dismiss or question such standards will not be as trusted. Members train 
together, at times they sleep in the same area, and they also fight together. 
Fighting is a group exercise; combat requires decisions to be made, understood, 
accepted, and effected in a rapid and instinctual fashion. Collective understanding, or a 
culture, makes this possible. A shared framework decreases uncertainty in war and 
increases the ability of its members to respond quickly. To develop a shared framework, 
militaries must inculcate values and beliefs such as integrity, instant obedience, trust, 
taking responsibility for one's actions, and loyalty to the organization. A military 
organization must stamp out to·some extent societal values that might threaten the 
group's integrity such as fairness, equality, independence, and the rights of an 
individual.IO A military organization's culture is largely functional. Efforts to develop a 
strong culture also contribute to the enduring quality of military cultures. 
10 As Elizabeth Kier noted: "The military's powerful assimilation process can displace the 
influence of the civilian society." Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the 
Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 71. 
8 
Because they act as a template for organizational cohesiveness, much the same 
way a paradigm can shape intellectual thought, II military cultures-shaped primarily by 
their historical experiences, respective operating environments, and aspects of their 
nation's culture--once established tend to endure. They endure through all but the most 
traumatic of experiences and even then they may remain intact. They endure through 
changes in leadership and persist even when domestic and international circumstances, 
technology, or individual preferences seem to indicate they should change. New weapons 
and concepts are accommodated within the structure of existing, time-tested, and 
preferably battle-experienced q.octrine and forces. Types of warfare that are incompatible 
with the dominant culture are accepted only in cases of extreme danger to the state when . 
political leaders are apt to intervene and reorient the service's priorities. 
The concept of "culture" is inevitably a loose one that defies rigor and precision 
and remains open to endless reinterpretation.12 The determined researcher usually has.few 
problems finding impressive ex post facto empirical support to substantiate his claims. 
Despite the dangers of crude reductionism, insensitivity to cultural changes, and ascribing 
causative power to distinctive, yet non-relevant cultural characteristics, the cultural 
paradigm remains an indispensable guide to the strategist's decisions. It guides how the 
11 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o/Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., enl. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970). For Kuhn, the concept ofa paradigm had several dimensions which 
allowed several manifold applications. Essentially, however, it meant a particular approach to problem-
solving that was common throughout an intellectual field. Put simply, a paradigm defines identify. 
12 N. J. Rengger, "Culture, Society, and Order in World Politics," in Dilemmas 0/ World 
Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (Oxford, England: 
Clarendon, 1992),85. 
9 
strategist interprets the facts and lends potency to one's intuition. Since rationality is 
inherently conditioned by culture, the study of culture is an inseparable part of strategy. 
c. STRATEGY 
The "naturall condition" of mankind as described by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan 
has not changed much in the intervening years. Despite scholarly enthusiasm, the addition 
of more democratic governments to an increasingly economically interdependent world 
has yet to awaken a somnambulant Kantian "common Power."13 Consequently, the first 
duty of government remains to protect the nation from the consequences of war. At a 
minimum, every state desires to minimize the possibility of domination by another state. 
No matter how modest, virtually every government in the world has a defense structure 
designed to forestall this possibility. 
Historically, the ultima ratio of a state, the most relevant means to deliver power 
in extreme circumstances is the controlled use of violence. The relation of power to 
political purpose is critical to the existence of a country. From this, Carl von Clausewitz 
concluded, "War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of 
other means." 14 Strategy-the relating of power to political purpose and vice versa-is 
therefore an inescapable reality of life in a Hobbesian world. Strategy resides in the realm 
I3 "Here it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them in 
awe, they are in that condition is called WaITe; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man." 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; first pub. 
1651),88. 
14 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976; first pub. 1832), 605. 
10 
of necessity rather than of choice; the only alternative to good strategic performance is 
fair or poor strategic performance, not no strategic performance. 15 Ultimately, the 
alternative to good strategy is national extinction. 
D. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II argues that Americans' experiences during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries shaped at least seven characteristics of American culture that 
influence the U.S. strategy-making process. Marked by physical and political survival 
during brutal wars, revolution, and national independence, this formative period saw the 
rise of cultural beliefs such as that the virtuous will ultimately triumph, that wars are to 
be brought to a successful and absolute conclusion, and that the United States is destined 
as the "city on the hill" providing a beacon of liberal democracy 
Chapter III examines eight characteristics of American culture formed during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that influence American strategy. This chapter 
explains how characteristics such as Americans' highly technical, mechanical, and direct 
approach to war and strategy, inability to view war and strategy in a holistic manner, and 
ignorance of the need for strategy were formed amidst industrial growth, technological 
change, the rise of the middle class and such hortatory concepts as nationalism and social 
Darwinism, and the preeminence of the United States. 
Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII addresses cultural aspects of the U.S. Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps, respectively. Their deeply-rooted cultures have been 
15 Colin S. Gray, "On Strategic Performance," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 10 (Winter 1995-96): 
11 
shaped by bloody battles and attritional campaigns, fiscal constraints, poisonous inter-
service relations (by international comparison), societal disinterest, and institutional 
identity crises caused by changes in technology and in the international security 
environment. The services also have been profoundly shaped by the character of their 
respective operational environments. Unlike traditional explanations of the U.S. military 
cultures, such as Carl Builder's The Masks a/War, that undervalues the operational mind-
set that undergirds those c.ultures, 16 this analysis examines the services' cultures from a 
more operational perspective. This thesis emphasizes the role the services' respective 
operating environment plays in shaping their divergent views on strategy and joint 
command structures and operat.ional doctrine. Examining how their respective operating 
environment shapes their divergent perspectives explains why they differ better than the 
common matrix-like approach . 
. Chapter IV argues that there are seven Army cultural characteristics that influence 
the American strategy-making process. Some aspects, such as a direct approach to 
strategy, obedience to the people and the government, and reluctance to commit to large-
scalewars without the support of society, are a result of American cultural-historical 
factors. Army officers' reluctance to commit to new concepts, their sense of teamwork, 
35. 
16 Such literature includes Carl H. Builder, The Masks o/War: American Military Styles in 
Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) and James M. Smith, "Service 
Cqltures, Joint Cultures, and the US Military," Airman-Scholar 4, no. I (Winter 1998): 3-17. Recent 
studies that have examined the services from an operational perspective include: Thomas E. Ricks, Making 
the Corps (New York: Scribner, 1997); James M. Smith, USAF Culture and Cohesion: Building an Air 
and Space Force/or the 2]51 Century, USAF Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 19 
(Colorado Springs, Colo.: INSS, 1998); and Roger Thompson, Brown Shoes, Black Shoes and Felt 
Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution a/the Post-War u.s. Navy, Center for Naval Warfare Studies 
12 
and a comparatively balanced view of the role technology plays in strategy stem from 
their experience of waging war on the land. 
Chapter V argues that the lack of Americans' firsthand knowledge about the sea 
results in a broad ignorance in society and in the military about the Navy. It argues that 
there are at least five Navy cultural characteristics which are formed by the exigencies of 
operating and fighting at sea. Characteristics such as the belief that it alone understands 
how to plan and execute naval strategy and an institutional reluctance to centralize 
command structures and develop detailed operational doctrine make it difficult for the 
Navy to integrate itself into a more interdependent military. 
Chapter VI examines eight characteristics of Air Force culture. It explains why the 
Air Force has problems that are more reflective of large corporations than its surface-
based brethren. It argues that some· aspects, such as a high degree of paranoia about its' 
survival and a narrow theoretical view of strategy, are based on its history while others, 
like being enamored with technology and a reluctance to develop detailed operational 
doctrine, are as a result of a unique perspective formed by air warfare. 
Chapter VII examines five aspects of Marine Corps culture that influence 
American strategy. The culture of Marines is the richest culture in the U.S. military: 
formalistic, isolated, elitist, with a deep anchor in their own history and mythology. This 
chapter finds that Marines share some cultural similarities with the Army by virtue of the 
requirements of operating on lanq. It also finds that the central element in Marine culture 
Strategic Research Department Research Report 5-95 (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College Press, 
1995). 
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is its abiding sense of vulnerability as an institution. Consequently, the Marine Corps is 
continually exploring the future security environment to determine which missions and 
roles will be important to the United States in the future. It then adopts itself to missions 
the other services do not want or cannot see, such as amphibious warfare or fighting 
America's small wars. 
Finally, the conclusion will review the arguments on the need for cultural self-
knowledge and how cultural tendencies might affect the development of strategy in the 
United States. It examines how one might embark on a line of inquiry into the 
qualification of differences between service cultures and how one might use the services' 
cultural characteristics in a constructive manner. It explores how one might investigate the 
manner and circumstances in which service cultures change and how one might go about . 
changing a service's culture. Finally, it argues that strategy is a matter of vital importance 
to the United States. 
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II. EARLY AMERICA 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries represent not merely an age of 
colonialism, but the formative period of American history. It was a period marked by 
violence and ruthless wars amidst a struggle for political if not physical survival up until 
the War of 1812 (1812-1815). It was a time characterized by a continuous level of 
perceived anxiety and vulnerability without the luxury of a clear definition of the threat. It 
was an age when European wars fought in the New World caused death and suffering 
among settlers who were powerless to prevent the conflicts. These centuries presented 
Americans with serious military problems which gave rise to considerable anxiety and 
shaped ways of thinking about peace and war. 
Seventeenth century history reveals Europe to be astonishingly violent and 
ideologically polarized. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) proved such. a frightful 
experience that European rulers saw the need to erect a balance-of-power system to 
maintain the status quo of governments and nations, establish large, professional armies, 
and institute standards of political and military conduct intended to mitigate the effects of 
wide-scale war on the general populace. The English civil war (1642-1649) and the 
English colonization ofIreland (1660s and 1670s) were particularly notable for their 
brutality amidst violent religious and political conflict. Albeit on a smaller scale, 
seventeenth century colonial life was just as violent. As John Shy noted: 
The early history of any seventeenth-century colony, even as late as the 
settlement of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, reveals that these were 
dangerous times, with violent people and tough leaders who felt the 
dangers keenly and were ready to use violence themselves .... [Their 
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leaders] knew very well that their ventures in the Western Hemisphere 
were semi-military, semi-piratical intrusions on the established empire of 
Spain and the antecedent colonial claims of France.) 
The likelihood of violence was consequently not far from the thoughts of settlers, 
who were not hesitant to use force to secure their objectives. The danger, however, did 
not materialize from the Spanish or the French, but from an unexpected quarter. 
The colonists had placed considerable hopes in converting the native Americans 
into Christians. The relationship between the two sides, however, became marked not by 
conversion and worship but by English condescension and incredibly barbaric warfare. 
The isolated and vulnerable E~glish colonists began waging war with tribes that were more 
militarily formidable than those the colonies' leaders had encountered in Ireland. The 
advantages of having a larger and more prosperous population did not give the English 
settlers a quick victory in their intermittent conflicts with ·the Native Americans. 
Moreover, the English colonies were not a tightly-knit homogenous society. They were a 
group of distinct societies separated by distance as well as beliefs. Only when they were 
forced to cooperate during the French and Indian War (1755-1763) did the colonies start 
to overcome suspicions of each other and become dimly aware of their status as 
"Americans. " 
) John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 1, no. 2 (Winter 1971): 212. Americans tend to forget that many ofthe 
expeditions' leaders were veterans of Irish pacification. It is not surprising then that English colonization in 
Ireland and in America were closely related in method, problems, and personnel. As a colonizer in Ireland 
and later in the America, for example, Sir Humphrey Gilbert tolerated no opposition from those natives that 
failed to accept their subservient roles and chose instead to rebel. In Ireland, Gilbert was known to have 
lined the path to his tent with the severed heads of Irish peasants. 
, 
16 
The French and Indian War was the last of four major wars (totaling thirty-seven 
years of conflict) which were fought between at least six European powers (Austria, 
Holland, France, Spain, Prussia, and Britain) and which spilled over onto American soil. 
Between 1689 to 1763, settlers and Native Americans were constantly enmeshed in 
imperial European politics acted out in the forests and on the plains of North America. 
During the French and Indian War, the relative weakness of the more thinly populated 
French settlements and co~tliness and inefficiency of transporting regular troops forced 
French officials to become more dependent on Indian allies than the British.2 A 
dependence upon such allies, however, meant that both the French and British became 
dependent on the tribes' style o.f guerilla warfare waged with unremitting brutality.3 
James Fenimore Cooper captured Americans' fear and anxiety during this war, who were 
made vulnerable by their isolation along a· wide and open frontier. 
The alarmed colonists believed that the yells of the savages mingled with 
every fitful gust of wind that issued from the interminable forests of the 
west. The terrific character of their merciless enemies increased 
immeasurably the natural horrors of warfare. Numberless recent massacres 
were still vivid in their recollections; nor was there any ear in the provinces 
so deaf as not to have drunk in with avidity the narrative of some fearful 
. tale of midnight murder, in which the natives of the forests were the 
principal and barbarous actors. As the credulous and excited traveler 
related the hazardous chances of the wilderness, the blood of the timid 
curdled with terror, and mothers cast anxious glances even at those children 
which slumbered within the security of the largest towns. In short, the 
magnifying influence of fear began to set at naught the calculations of 
2 Shy, 213. 
3 John Keegan noted that: "Intertribal warfare was a fact of American Indian life long before the 
coming of the Europeans, as in so many 'hard primitive' societies; Indians fought for honour, revenge, 
excitement, and in order to replace the casualties of war by seizing and 'adopting' captives from the 
enemy." John Keegan, Fields o/Battle: The Wars/or North America (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 
103. 
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reason, and to render those who should have remembered their manhood, 
the slaves ofthe basest ofpassions.4 
One can understand how such experiences triggered powerful emotions that provided a 
rich milieu for incipient beliefs about war and strategy to take root and grow. Experiences 
in the Revolutionary War (1775-1783) would provide even more fertile ground for such 
beliefs to flourish. 
The colonists' cooperation with the British during the French and Indian War was 
unprecedented. The colonists supplied almost twenty thousand troops and over £2 
million to the war effort. In one year, the colony of Massachusetts enlisted five thousand 
personnel out of a male population of about fifty thousand.5 The colonists contributed to 
making North America perhaps the most extensively fortified zone in the world.6 As a 
result of the British victory, which saw the French driven out from mainland North 
America, the colonists believed themselves to be a franchised member of the empire. 
Because of the enormous debt accumulated in waging the French and Indian War 
(over half of the national budget went to pay the interest on it), the British attempted to 
reassert the authority of Parliament in taxing the well-established representative 
provincial assemblies. What began as a gentrified tax rebellion was transformed into a 
mass movement in which the people became intimately involved in securing and shaping 
their nation's destiny. Indeed, many forget that, proportionate to the population, a 
4 James Fenimore Cooper, The Last of the Mohicans (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1993; first 
pub. 1826), 4. 
5 Robert D. Divine, T.H. Breen, George M. Fredrickson, and R. Hal Williams, American Past 
and Present, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 127. This was a commitment which meant that the 
war was being waged on a scale comparable to the world wars. 
6 Keegan, 103. 
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greater percentage of Americans died during the Revolution than in any other war in 
American history with the exception of the Civil War (1861-1865). The experience of the 
Revolutionary War consequently represented another traumatic period. The experience of 
victory over a powerful country brought proof of Americans' beliefs that the virtuous 
would ultimately triumph, that wars are to be brought to a successful and absolute 
conclusion, ana that the United States is destined as the '"city on the hill," providing a 
beacon of liberal democracy. 
These centuries were a formative period in which American beliefs on war and 
strategy were formed and mythologized. In the behavior of these early Americans, during 
this time, there were at least seven enduring and interrelated characteristics of American 
culture. 
First, the Americans were wont to demand absolute solutions to their military' 
problems. They were strong in numbers, yet vulnerable. The colonists were angered and 
frightened by repeated and brutal attacks that materialized seemingly out of nowhere. 
They neither were parties to the causes of European wars fought in the New World nor 
were they able to prevent them:7 Consequently, they made extreme proposals for 
solutions to the military problems. Such problems were an irritant that threatened what 
they believed was their right to live life free of mental angst caused by outside 
interference. Such problems were to be extirpated as quickly as possible to allow a return 
to normalcy. There was, underst~ndably, little patience for limited political solutions or 
7 Shy, 214. 
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negotiated settlements. For settlers, war was not a continuation of politics by other 
means.8 It was not a cerebral and detached affair-it was a visceral struggle for survival. 
The American tendency for absolutism originated in their early experiences in war. 
By 1763, as Shy notes, "All the French and Spanish power on the North American 
continent east of the Mississippi was actually 'extirpated'."9 Indeed, it is quite 
remarkable that in almost every instance-including the early, formative French and 
Indian War which saw the French driven from the mainland of North America, the 
Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812-Americans realized an "absolute" solution to 
their wars. While it was not an unreasonable response to difficult security problems, the 
cultural tendency to want absolute solutions was and remains umealistic in terms of 
normal European and Middle Eastern relations in which limited solutions and negotiated· 
settlements are common. IO Since the nineteenth century, wars more often that not have 
been characterized by pernicious inconclusiveness rather than by absolute solutions. I I 
One might be tempted to argue that ifthe United States had not been compelled to honor 
the balance-of-power system in the Middle East, this cultural tendency might have 
impelled U.S. troops to drive on towards Baghdad. 
Second, the early Americans turned wars into crusades. Because of their 
experiences living in England, they were contemptuous of the idea of professional, 
8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976; first pub. 1832),605. 
9 Shy, 215. 
10 Ibid. 
II Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1993),300. 
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standing annies (though the settlers probably could not even have raised one given the 
economic state of early America). During the sporadic calls to anns, local communities 
were inclined to take action only in retaliation for attacks that they believed-rightly or 
wrongly-immediately threatened their existence. However, public support for action 
would invariably increase if such attacks were believed to have been perpetrated with 
extreme violence, prejudice, asocial, or criminal behavior. 
Historically, whether soldiers on the Rio Grande, passengers on the Lusitania, or 
sailors on a battleship in Havana or Pearl Harbor, once Americans have been attacked and 
killed, arguments about the c~uses, the political objectives of war, and the means have 
become secondary considerations. 12 Thus, the call to anns has been couched not in 
political terms, but in religious and moral overtones that have been more readily 
understood and accepted by communities whose raisons d'etre have always included the 
establishment of a society that stood as a beacon of righteousness. This tendency was 
evident in the Fall of 1990 when President Bush characterized Saddam Hussein as the 
moral equivalent of Adolf Hitler. An administration that had insisted on turning a military 
campaign based on national interests into a moral crusade' became trapped by this 
tendency; Bush had a difficult time explaining to Americans how the United States could 
leave such a man in power. 
Third, when the early Americans resorted to force, it tended to be belated but 
massive. The following characteristics of the United States suggest that it is not well-
12 Shy, 217. 
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suited to agile military force: Americans' disinclination to wage war against all but the 
most immediate threats; their resistance to committing to long-tenn conflicts because of 
the reliance on militias; their belief that war is abnonnal and is instigated only by evil men 
and causes; and their belief that military problems were to be extirpated in a decisive 
manner, without resorting to limited political solutions or negotiated settlements. 13 
Moreover, as Colin Gray noted: 
Attempts to wage war without the blessing of American society are likely 
to fail. For any enterprise lacking obvious life or death implications, the 
government ... can expect public support only if the military operation is 
brief, successful, and attended by few casualties. 14 
Following the call to arms, however, Americans have always expected a decisive victory. 
Indeed, the cycle of the early Americans' early experiences in war--early defeats, societal 
reaction, military recovery, perseverance, and ultimate victory--came to be accepted as 
their wartime modus operandi. 
Fourth, the early Americans came to confuse their successes in war with 
virtuousness. Beginning with the French and Indian War, each new conflict saw their 
nascent community sink to the depths of despair only to gather its strength and seize 
remarkable victories. Notwithstanding other, more fundamental, reasons for the 
withdrawal of European forces (such as balance-of-power politics in Europe or factors 
internal to the enemy), each victory apparently offered proof that good causes triumph 
and that American ideas on economics and governance were superior. From the beginning 
I3 Colin S. Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991," in The Making 
a/Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),596. 
14 Ibid. 
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of the republic, Americans came to be deeply convinced that the world is destined to be 
governed by the guiding light of American liberal democracy. The result of these early 
victories, therefore, was the illusion that America was all important. ls 
Fifth, as a consequence of their belief that America is a land of new beginnings and 
infinite possibilities, the ever-forward looking Americans are largely indifferent to history 
and have a poor sense of the value ofhistory.l6 This indifference allows Americans to 
avoid the behavior of soc~eties that possess deeply-rooted memories of political and 
cultural strife. This. also prevents them from seeing the past as a guide to the future. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan remarked that: "Historical instances, by their concrete force, are 
worth reams of dissertation." Is not "history ... the experience of others, recorded for our 
use"?17 
15 Shy, 216. Writing in 1971, Shy noted: "Disappointment and disgust, as much as moral and 
political disapproval, have provided the emotional fuel for antiwar action. Even the outrage of the young 
indicates how far they were taught to expect a smoother, cleaner American military performance [in 
Vietnam] and how little prepared they were to face the prospect offailure .... Many ... think that they and the 
nation will ride it out, that the Ten Years War is only a bad dream which will soon be over and forgotten, 
that the social and psychic damage can be limited, and that other issues, other dangers are really more 
urgent. Perhaps so; all gloomy prediction is mere speculation. Nothing, however, in the historical record 
gives much support to their modest optimism. On the contrary, the American military past, if! have 
interpreted correctly, warns us that the effects of confessed failure are likely to be protracted, unpredictable, 
and severe." Shy, 228. . 
16 This is not to say that American idealism and optimism are themselves astrategic in nature. A 
French veteran of the Second World War wrote: "In 1950 France was in ruins. I saw only a world marked 
by war, and by fear. I believed that it was not finished, that there would be a next war. I did not think it 
would be possible to build a life, to have a family. Then came [a] group of Americans, attractive, idealistic, 
optimistic, protected, believing and acting as though anything was possible. It was a transforming 
experience for me." Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The u.s. Army from the Normandy Beaches to 
the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1997),487. 
17 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy, Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and 
Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, 1919; first pub. 1911), p. 161 and p. 9; 
quoted in Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Stratecraftfor the Next Century (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 15. 
23 
Unfortunately, the study of history in the United States is not popular. The 
presence of history in the curricula of the nation's educational institutions is eroding. 
Whether the industrial, the atomic, or the information-age, Americans' cultural yearnings 
towards technological panaceas has resulted in an increase in technical training at the 
expense of an education in history or in the social sciences. ls Americans' ability to see the 
experiences of the past as a guide to the future has seriously atrophied. Americans will 
find new ways of commi~ing the oldest of strategic errors. Americans will continue to 
confront a problem on its own merits, solve it in the spirit of a problem-solver, and then 
move on to the next challenge. 
American prophets of ipformation warfare may have an excellent case to advance. 
Yet some education in history might alert them that a heavy emphasis on engineering and 
hard science is not conducive to innovation. 19 It may alert 'them that what the United 
States needed at Pearl Harbor was not more information; it needed a deeper understanding 
of the political and cultural context ofwar.2o An education in history that reaches only as 
18 Unfortunately, the military has decided to follow suit. As the then president of the National 
Defense University noted: "The current revolutionary force puts a higher premium on basic and engineering 
sciences .... In short, the c'enter of mass at the war colleges must move toward more technical academic 
disciplines." Ervin J. Rokke, "Military Education for the New Age," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 9 
(Autumn 1995): 22. For another example of such thinking, see Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, A Report of the CSIS Study Group on Professional Military Education, Professional Military 
Education: An Assetfor Peace and Progress. (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1997). For a spirited review of 
the report, see Williamson Murray, "How Not to Advance Professional Military Education." Strategic 
Review (Summer 1997): 73-77. 
19 See Williamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Future," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 12 
(Surpmer 1996): 51-u0. Murray noted that: "The services must encpurage greater familiarity with 
nonlinear analysis .... While some suggest that the military needs more engineers to encourage nonlinear 
thinking, they are wrong. In fact, what the services lack are biologists, mathematicians, and historians." 
Murray, "Innovation," 60. 
20 See Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological 
Hubris," The National Interest, no. 48 (Summer 1997): 57-u4. 
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far back as the Vietnam War might even be sufficient to Americans to alert them to the 
boundaries of their claims and the dangers of unrestrained technological hubris. 
Sixth, because wars in the early, expansive North America were characterized by 
dispersed forts and settlements, defenseless borders, and quasi-guerrilla warfare, early 
Americans lacked a clear definition of the threat they faced. Without the benefit of a clear 
threat, the vulnerable and isolated Americans worried themselves into a constant state of 
military insecurity. In time, as Shy observed: 
There was a growing accumulation of potential military power, with no 
apparent economic or demographic limits on how much military power it 
might be possible to accumulate. The limits of American power were thus 
not seen to be intrinsic ... but rather were to be set by the political process, 
which presumably would establish them on the basis of some strategic 
calculation. But without clearly defined dangers, such calculations could 
not be made, at least convincingly; and any politically established level of 
military power inevitably seemed arbitrary}1 
The perception of military insecurity bereft of a self-evident threat, and the 
accumulation of military power without any apparent limits, usually results in a kind of 
strategic indeterminacy and a concomitant feast-or-famine cycle of defense preparation.22 
As a consequence, new strategic concepts and concomitant weapons systems are unlikely 
to be provided unless they can catch a wave of American insecurity and its permissive 
budgetary climate. 
Seventh, early American society did not regard its professional military 
establishment as an important state institution. It was widely believed, rather, that the 
21 Shy, 21 I. 
22 Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age," 589. 
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nation was able to help expel the French from North America and revolt against the 
wishes of the British not because of the nation's professional soldiers, but because of its 
citizen-soldiers. Consequently, there was a tendency to view the professional military as 
unnecessary and ineffectuaP3 The perception was that when it came to war, the nation 
could roll up its sleeves and solve the problem with limited guidance from the military. 
Left to the vagaries of fickle administrations and Congressional assemblies that would just 
as soon not deal with intr~ctable international problems until a threat became evident, the 
U.S. military servic~s formulated theories according to their own doctrine and their own 
view ofthe nation's interests.24 
In terms of the number and degree of cultural influences that exert significant. 
pressures on the U.S. strategy-making process, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were perhaps the most formative. Many astrategic tendencies such as wanting absolute 
solutions, turning wars into crusades, and visions of an omnipotent America were formed. 
Many of the cultural tendencies borne of this period involve the political aspects of 
strategy. This period shaped how Americans wars were to begin and end. During this 
period, the relationship between society, government, and the military was formed. 
23 Shy, 216. 
24 Given the lack of societal interest and fiscal paucity, the appearance of what seem to be self-
serving service theories is understandable since the emphasis has been on catching the imagination of the 
electorate and legislators rather than on combating the security threat effectively,. 
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III. MODERN AMERICA 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw America's coming of age. It was a 
period marked by civil war, the conquering of the frontier, massive industrialization, and 
world wars. It was a time characterized less by external threats and more by overcoming 
problems befitting a nation growing in size and industrial capacity. These centuries did 
not fundamentally alter how Americans thought about peace and war. The tendencies 
formed during this period are more about the means, not the political objectives of 
American strategy. 
Americans moved West for many reasons. Some wanted adventure. Some sought 
their fortune among the growing number of mines, advancing railroads, and ranches. 
Others wanted to escape the factories of the East. A few moved to Utah to escape 
religious persecution. Most simply wanted to better their lives. Whatever their reasons, 
the experience of a moving frontier had a lasting influence on American strategic culture. 
This period shaped how Americans approach problems. It shaped how Americans 
approach war and strategy. Amidst this formative experience, Americans experienced 
another in the coming of the industrial age. 
While the frontier was being conquered, the United States was fast becoming an 
industrial society. At the start of the Civil War, the country lagged well behind 
industrializing nations such as Great Britain, France, and Germany. By the tum of the 
century, it had vaulted far ahead of these European competitors. American manufacturing 
output exceeded the combined output of its European rivals. During this time, cities grew 
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and farm production rose. Developments in manufacturing, transportation and 
communications changed American society. The typewriter, Elisha Otis's new elevator, 
and the telephone were the products of an ever-improving and growing civilization.! 
Advanced technology had captured the imagination of American society. Upon viewing 
paintings, sculptures, and an enormous, four-story steam engine at the Centennial 
Exposition in 1876, novelist William Dean Howells preferred the engine. "It is in these 
things of iron and steel," he remarked, "that the national genius most freely speaks."2 
While they have always bee!l enamoured with technology, Americans' fascination 
with military technology grew immensely at the turn of the century. Fueled by a popular 
press that presented battleships as the most technologically advanced product of the 
machine age, it was an era of unbridled enthusiasms of citizens privileged to participate in 
the advancement of their country amidst a backdrop of great power nationalism, 
imperialism, and social Darwinism. Technology had delivered powerful warships as 
symbols of national pride which promised to deliver decisive, strategic victories. 
The wars of modem American did a great deal to strengthen established facets of 
the way Americans thInk about war. With their faith and competence In technology, 
managerial and problem-solving skills, insularity, and unmatched industrial capacity, 
Americans were able to substitute both sheer quantities of assets and the power of 
machines for strategic skills and lives. This is not to say that Americans were averse to 
! Robert D. Divine, T.H. Breen, George M. Fredrickson, and R. Hal Williams, American Past 
and Present, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCoIIins, 1995),536. 
2 Ibid. 
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suffering terrible losses or that they left others to do the real fighting. If guilt has to be 
assuaged, history records enough occasions when American leaders did not hesitate 
sending soldiers into attritional battles or campaigns. Whether along the shattered fences 
of Fredericksburg, in the twisted forests ofSaint-Mihiel, in the cold skies over Nazi 
Germany, or among the Solomon Islands, Americans have shown as much a determination 
to fight and, if necessary, die in numbers as the next citizen soldier. Notwithstanding the 
American belief that members of the nation's armed forces are also members of American 
society who have value in their own right, democratic governments inherently are inclined 
towards saving the lives of the sons and daughters of the electorate rather than those of 
the enemy. Americans prefer fi~epower over manpower in war. 
These two centuries represent a formative period in which many of the eight 
influential characteristics of American culture influenced how America means to effect 
strategy. and fight wars. 
First, the relative absence of societal support on the frontier and the requirements 
of overcoming the technical problems encountered during industrialization bred a spirit of 
pragmatism and engineering problem-solving that is reflected in how Americans solve 
strategic problems. Americans' approach to war is, consequently, more reflective of 
Baron Antoine Henri de 10mini than Clausewitz. Americans strategists such as Herman 
Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and Robert McNamara and strategic analysis organizations such 
as·RAND epitomize Americans' engineering approach to .solving the more intractable 
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problems of strategy.3 Like de 10mini, they sought (and largely failed) to abstract 
strategic problems from broader issues such as culture, by forcing them into a sterile 
environment where immutable principles and equations can be trusted to divine the 
correct answers. Clausewitz decried such formulas as misleading; the uncertainty of war 
makes sUbjective judgements an inseparable part of strategy.4 The style of defense 
leadership in the United States has evolved into one that is more industrial-managerial 
rather than strategic. 
The McNamara revolution of the 1960s effected the domination of quantitatively 
expressible analysis. As a result, American defense leaders often become preoccupied 
debating the technical merits of large weapons systems. As a result, the primacy of policy 
as a guide for strategy and of strategy as a guide of military power and weapons systems 
has been reversed. The introduction of almost every major weapons system renews a 
paroxysm of debate that sends the defense-intellectual community back to the conceptual 
drawing board, and all too frequently temporarily suspends strategic planning. The 
tendency to confuse tactical and technical issues :vith what is assumed to be self-
3 American strategic thinking during the Cold War tended to be heavily deductive and analytical 
because most ofthe American civilian strategists possessed scientific, engineering, or mathematical 
disciplinary backgrounds. Given an education in (strategic) history which imbues a sensitivity towards the 
intractable and indeterminate nature of war and strategy, much of the frenzied preoccupation in developing a 
theoretical approach to the three most central ideas of nuclear-age American strategic theory--deterrence, 
limited war, and arms control-for example, could have been avoided as each has very considerable pre-
nuclear analogues. Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 
1982), 18-19. . 
4 As Gray noted: "Apparent laws of statecraft and strategy are really subjective probabilistic 
claims. Moreover, the probability at issue is not of a kind familiar to a statistician, since probability cannot 
be calculated for unique events. Recognition of indeterminacy necessarily pervades [strategy] .... The history 
of war and defense preparation is a history of struggle against uncertainty and ignorance. There is no more a 
science of war than there is, or can be, a science for peace." Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: 
Strategy and Stratecraftfor the Next Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990),25. 
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explanatory strategy prompted James Billington to note, "We ought to be seeking 
tentative answers to fundamental questions, rather than definitive answers to trivial 
ones."5 
Second, Americans' fascination with technology, particularly with mechanical 
means of transportation, and their incomparable logistics skills was a logical outgrowth of 
their effort to conquer the wilderness. American society responded to its shortage of 
labor, particularly high skilled labor, by embracing machines. The American preference for 
the use of machines lies in the low people-to-space ratio of frontier America.6 Frontier 
experience also bred mastery of logistical thinking: As Denis Brogan discerned: 
Space determined the American way in war, space and the means to 
conquer space .... Into empty land the pioneers moved, feeling their way 
slowly, carefully, timidly if you like. The reckless lost their scalps; the 
careful, the prudent, the rationally courageous survived and by logistics, 
by superiority in resources; in tenacity, in numbers. Americans who did 
not learn these lessons were not much use in the conquest of the West. 7 
These skills were honed as the continental and overseas geography of America's Civil 
War and twentieth century wars, respectively, required competence, even excellence in 
logistic planning and execution.8 This tendency usually moves the United States towards 
strategies that would capitalize on such skills. Yet logistical successes such as D-day, 
5 James H. Billington, quoted in Ann Geracimos, "New Librarian Called Fundamental Scholar," 
The Washington Times, 14 September 1987; quoted in Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, 9. 
6 Colin S. Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991." in The Making 
a/Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 590. 
7 Denis W. Brogan, The American Character (New York: privately printed, 1944), 150; quoted 
in Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age," 590. 
8 As Gray noted: "The insouciance with which Gennan staff officers approached the supply 
planning and execution of great campaigns in two world wars-and the consequences of that 
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Inchon, and Desert ShieldlDesert Storm promote a logistical hubris that is captured in the 
U.S. military aphorism that "professionals should worry about logistics and amateurs will 
concern themselves with strategy." One has to look no further than the Vietnam War to 
understand the consequences of such thinking: technology and logistics are raw materials 
for strategy, but they are not strategy. 
Third, because of its size, its historical experiences of success in war, and the 
impatient manrier of its people, America has developed a way of strategy that is 
fundamentally continentalist and direct.9 The total war experiences of the United States 
during this period resulted in Americans becoming even more impatient with the restraints 
on its ability to prosecute war. The horrors of the Civil War and the world wars gave 
tremendous impetuous to the view that "war is hell," and the best thing one can do in 
such a situation is to "get the hell out of there" by the fastest possible means. American 
Army Colonel James Rudder's open letter to his troops during the drive across France in 
1944 is indicative of the American approach to strategy: 
There is only one reason for our being here and that is to eliminate the 
enemy that has brought the war about. There is only one way to eliminate 
the enemy and that is to close with him. Let's all get oll' with the job we 
were sent here to do in order that we may return home at the earliest 
possible moment. 10 
The tendency to adopt a direct approach to war and strategy and return to 
normalcy can be evinced in many cases in American strategic history, but particularly in 
casualness-stands in significant contrast to the twentieth century logistical triumphs of the United States." 
Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age," 590. 
9 Ibid., 594. 
10 Michael E. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 
1944-1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994),228. 
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the case of Union General William Sherman's strategy to take the horrors of modern war 
to the Southerners during his drive to the Atlantic Ocean during the Civil War, I 1 and the 
case of General Curtis LeMay's strategic bombing campaign over Japan in the Second 
World War. Termed military realism, this approach assumes that the country that starts 
the conflict commits a criminal act and in doing so forfeits any rights they might have had 
to protection under the law. In other words, one cannot violate the rule of law in pursuit 
of selfish interests and then turn around during the conflict to seek protection under the 
law, when those who were violated ~ecide when and how to strike back. 
Given its insularity, albeit on a grand scale, the United States cannot wage its wars 
unless its navy maintains the sea lines of communication. Indeed, American seapower 
arguably midwifed American victories (including the Civil War) during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Despite this, as Gray notes, "the United States is neither a natural 
seapower nor does a maritime perspective and precepts dominate its strategic culture."12 
Americans' desire to return to normalcy and the desire to chart what they assume to be 
the forward progress of its military towards victory, promotes emphasis on a direct 
approach to warfare and victory through decisive battles rather than through the slow 
approach of maritime encirclement. 
Fourth, because of their continental isolation, weak neighbors, and belated yet 
massive responses, Americans have tended to become preoccupied with developing 
II As Russell Weigley noted: "The fascination with Sherman has lived on, however much his 
design for war reflected his stark belief that 'war is simply power unrestrained by constitution or compact': 
'You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty and you cannot redefine it'." Russell 
F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 152. 
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deterrence strategies and weapons systems, which may not be entirely effective in war, 13 
at the expense of preparing themselves and their armed forces for the certitude of war. 
Americans' rationale behind organizing and maintaining NATO and their desire to extend 
nuclear deterrence over distant allies stemmed from the desire to contain Soviet power 
(and Nazi power before it) onshore in Europe. The influence of an overemphasis on 
deterrence was' evident during the Cold War when civilian strategists and scholars 
neglected the question of how, if deterrence failed, the United States would fight a nuclear 
war and with what objectives. 
Fifth, Americans ignore the need for strategy. Several characteristics helped to 
obviate the perceived need for strategy and relating power to political purpose: 
Americans' faith in technology, managerial and problem-solving skills; the reality of 
material abundance; a history of insularity from threats; the freedom to chose when to' 
surge its abundant defense mobilization potential; and the ability to substitute both sheer 
quantities of assets and the power of machines for military skills and lives. As Gray 
noted, this "sloppiness bred by success" has made Americans largely indifferent to the 
exigencies of strategy .14 The United States has experienced nothing remotely resembling 
neither the battle of lena in Prussia, where between two battles the country was lost in a 
single day (14 October 1806), nor the Russian/Soviet experiences of 1812 and 1941-42 
12 Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age," 594-595. 
13 Gray noted that: "The United States has a strategic culture ... centered upon the quaint belief 
that the country can purchase the right weapons in the right numbers to serve both as a deterrent in 
peacetime and as an adequate arsenal in crises or war." Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age," 598. 
14 Ibid., 595. 
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(particularly those during the siege of Leningrad). Societies that undergo such experiences 
and that do not possess the geographical and industrial advantages of the United States 
are more fatalistic about the dangers of war and more aware of the need not to neglect 
strategy. In contrast, American history tends to teach its citizens that war is episodic and 
is waged abroad, and that the United States will eventually win regardless of the quality 
or quantity of strategy and military preparedness before the war. IS 
Sixth, perhaps bec~use of its mixed continental and maritime heritage, the United 
States tends not to view war and strategy in a holistic manner. Wars are planned for and 
waged by different military services reflecting three distinctly different operating 
environments-air, land, and s~a. The inferable success of each of the services in their 
respective mediums against Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and Iraq further reinforces the 
tendency to be relatively disinterested in gaining an understanding of the totality of war: 
This predilection precludes the defense establishment from gaining a deeper appreciation 
of the advantages of fighting jointly. It precludes them from understanding when the 
military should fight jointly and be more accommodating when geographic, political, or 
military factors will dictate the need to fight separately. Due to fiscal, geographic, and 
political constraints, the United States may not have the luxury of pursuing redundant 
paths to future victory. 
Seventh, the different perspectives of elected officials and military officers hinder 
the ?bility of each to recognize when political goals and military capabilities may be 
IS Gray, War, Peace, mid Victory, 48. 
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poorly matched. Strategy in America lies awkwardly between the profession of politics 
and the profession of arms. It is the bridge that connects them, yet is neither ofthose 
activities. 16 Because of Americans' cultural indifference to all but the most immediate of 
security concerns, politicians tend to gravitate to the more intellectually comfortable and 
observable confines of domestic politics. As a result, they tended to be reelected due to 
their seniority and policy-making skills rather on their skills in understanding and relating 
the use of force with political objectives and vice versa. 
Because of the diffusion of political authority inherent in the American system of 
government and the divergent interests of policy-makers, policy in times of peace may be 
formed without due considerations to military requirements. For the military, the problem 
lies in viewing the strategic side of national security increasingly as the domain of 
politicians and diplomats, and the operational and tactical sides as the domain of the 
military, free from civilian "meddling."17When asked by political leaders, U.S. military 
officers will tend to confine their advice on strategy to purely essential military matters. 
Indeed, within all the armed services, there is a str.ong bias against officers as "strategists." 
One does not hope to be labeled as such without first accumulating an impeccable 
operational record. 
The effects of divergent civilian and military perspectives on the strategy-making 
process was evident during the Vietnam War. Resentful of the intrusive civilian strategic 
16 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, ]996),236. 
17 Carl H. Builder, "Keeping the Strategic Flame," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 14 (Winter 
1996--97): 77. 
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analysts and lacking confidence in their own atrophied strategic skills, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff during the Vietnam War hesitated to force their unique insights into the strategy-
making process. Instead, the chiefs acquiesced and, with little questioning, accepted 
President Johnson's objectives in Vietnam. In so doing, they facilitated Johnson's 
implementation of ambitious political goals that clearly exceeded the military means 
envisioned. 18 
Eighth, perhaps because of their continental isolation and success in war against 
weaker adversaries, Americans tend to be blind to cultural differences. Notwithstanding 
the heritage of immigration, Americans have generally not studied the cultures of other 
societies. In the most traumatic of U.S. wars-the Revolutionary War and the Civil 
War-the cultures of the combatants were too similar to have made Americans aware of· 
the dangers of ethnocentrism. 19 This ethnocentrism limits Americans' ability to 
understand the motivations behind the policies and strategies of other nations. While it 
does foster national and organizational hubris and insularity, the tendency to be 
insensitive to cultural differences also blinds Americans from understanding the 
importance of identifying their own national and organizational 'cultural tendencies. It 
limits the ability of elected officials and military officers to understand each other's 
interests and motivations. Within the military, it acts as a catalyst to raise already 
contentious inter-service debates to internecine levels,20 inhibits the adaptation of a 
18 See H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997). 
19 Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age," 595. 
20 For an example of how inter-service debates can influence American strategy, see McMaster. 
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holistic approach to strategy, and precludes an appreciation of when to and when not to 
fight in an overly joint manner. 
The nineteenth and twentieth formed many cultural tendencies that at times have 
had a deleterious effect on the U.S. strategy-making process. The Vietnam experience 
certainly laid bare ignorance and indifference to other cultures; the waging of a limited war 
with excessive reliance on machines, firepower, and logistics; and the inability to 
recognize when political goals and military capabilities may be poorly matched. 
Yet other cultural aspects also ensure that certain military enterprises are 
embarked on admirably. Fortunately, many of these enterprises include larger, more 
orthodox tasks that bear upon war and peace. Planning and execution of a D-Day landing, 
of nuclear deterrence, anintricate SlOP plan, or oflarge-scale conventional war with 
redundant paths to victory, all exploit America's strengths and avoid the worst of 
. America's weaknesses. Because strategy is the process of relating military power to 
political objectives, a strategist cannot afford to ignore the deeply-rooted cultures of those 
that wield the nation's military power. 
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IV. U.S. ARMY 
The essence of Army culture is defined by its traditional slogan: "Duty, Honor, 
Country." The Army sees its own honor in its role as the nation's obedient and loyal 
servant. It views its duty as maintaining the skills that must be taught to the citizenry 
when America's citizen-soldiers are called on to fight. It sees its purpose as responding to 
the tasks the American people will ask of it and, more importantly, as preparing to win 
the nation's wars by forging America's citizenry into an expeditionary force.! 
From the Army's perspective, its fundamental weapon system is not a tank. Nor 
is it a rifle. It is a citizen who 'is armed. No other service has such strong ties to American 
society. The Army belongs not so much to the government as to the American people, 
who take a proprietary interest in it. Because the Army is not as isolated from the rest of 
society, unlike as the expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps, Americans are more familiar 
with the Army than with any other service. Consequently, Army culture tends to reflect. 
many aspects of American culture. Those aspects of Army culture that differ from 
mainstream American culture result from the mind-set that is shaped by the exigencies of 
land warfare. Seven aspects of Army culture influence the development of U.S. strategy. 
First, the Army is the most obedient and loyal of the nation's services. While they 
were suspicious of all standing military forces, early Americans viewed the Army with 
. particular suspicion. By virtue of their missions and size, the Navy and Marine Corps 
tended not to be viewed as threats to the republic. As a result of such scrutiny, the Army 
I Carl H. Builder, The Masks o/War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989),33. 
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became-and remains--extremely sensitive to Americans' suspicion of standing 
professional armies.2 When the Army discusses itself, it does so in terms of its deep 
roots in society, its utter obedience to the wishes of the people, and its historic service to 
its nation.3 
Another reason why the Army tends to be the most obedient and loyal of the U.S. 
services may be that the Army has participated in a multitude of politically contentious 
tasks such as Southern reconstruction, fighting the Native Americans, labor disputes, the 
Spanish War, Cuban occupation, Philippine pacification, construction and operation of 
the Panama Canal, and the Mexican punitive expedition. As a result, the Army developed 
an image of itself as the government's obedient servant, divested of political 
responsibility.4 
As a consequence of its obedience to the people and the government, the Army-
unlike the other services-has not been inclined to develop strategies or concepts that 
2 It should not be a surprise that James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay devoted 
substantial portions of The Federalist Papers (1787-1788) to explaining that the proposed military 
institutions would not threaten domestic interests. ' 
3 The following are examples of how the Anny discusses itself. "Out ofthe Anny's long and 
varied service to our nation," Bernard Rogers wrote, "have emerged certain fundamental roles, principles 
and precepts .... They constitute the Army's anchor in history, law and custom, suggesting the sources of 
its present strength and the trust and confidence of the nation in the essential role of the Army." Bernard W. 
Rogers, U.S. Department ofthe Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 1978), p. i. Bruce Palmer, Jr. noted: "Although each of our armed services is unique and different, 
the U.S. Army holds a special position of significance and trust. Its ranks come from the people, the 
country's roots, and it is closest to the people." Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: America's Military 
Role in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984),209. The 1981 versions ofFM100-1 stated: 
"The Army ethic must strive to set the institution of the Army and its purpose in proper context-that 
service to the larger institution of the nation, and fully responsive to the needs of its people." U.S. 
Department of the Army, FM 100-1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1981),24. All three 
examples quoted in Builder, The Masks o/War, 20. 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o/Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1957), 261. 
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appear to serve its institutional interests. Indeed, the Anny has rarely seen itself as 
having an independent sense of mission or purpose apart from that of the United States. 
While it has undergone numerous identity crises, the Anny has never doubted its future; , 
it is secure in the belief that the nation will always need an army regardless of its size and 
whether it is composed of professionals or professionally led citizen-soldiers. The Anny 
is more accepting of the government's political decisions than the other services. With 
little or no remonstration, the Anny also is more accepting of such policies as race and 
gender integration, post-war defense cuts, and service integration. It may even be more 
accepting of the government's wartime political objectives. 
Second, the Anny is reluctant to commit to war without societal support. During 
the Vietnam War, President Johnson refused to mobilize the reserves because of the alarm 
that it might have set off in society. After the war, Anny leaders pledged that the service 
would never again commit itself to war without the people's support. The Anny made a 
conscious decision to integrate its reserves so deeply into the active-force structure that it 
would be almost impossible to deploy significant forces without calling up the reserves. 5 
They reasoned that a society so enfranchised would be more inclined to debate and accept 
a war's goals, means, and potential costs. They believed that no one should start a war 
without first being clear in one's mind what one intends to achieve by that war and how 
5 During the Gulf War, reserves made up 58 percent of Army total strength compared to 31 
percent ofthe Air Force, 29 percent of the Navy and Marines, and 32 percent of the Coast Guard. Harry G. 
Summers, Jr. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis a/the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992),73. Today, 
over 54 percent of the Army resides in the reserve component. As Generals Reimer (the Army Chief of Staff) 
Plewes, and Schultz noted: "Together our Active Army, National Guard and Reserve forces comprise the 
Total Army. A clear but bitter lesson ofthe Vietnam War is that when America fights with anything less 
than a Total Army effort we diminish ourselves." Dennis J. Reimer, Thomas J. Plewes, and Roger C. 
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one intends to conduct it.6 Indeed, there is no other service as intimately familiar with 
Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" than the ArmyJ The Army is sensitive to society's 
attitudes and hesitates to commit itself unless it has society's blessings. 
Third, the Army advocates a direct approach to strategy. For example, the first 
two sentences of the current Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 state: 
The mission of the United States Army is to protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States. The Army does this by deterring war 
and, when deterrence fails, by achieving quick, decisive victory .... 8 
The desire for a quick victory is perhaps attributable to the Americans' lack of patience 
and desire to return to 'normal~y as soon as possible. It also may reflect the desire of 
Army officers to win the war, before society turns against the war effort. 
Yet the desire for a quick victory also may be a reflection of the nature of land 
warfare. Few places on earth are as horrible as a battlefield. Whether along the shattered 
fences of Fredericksburg, in the twisted and broken forests ofSaint-Mihiel, or on blood-
soaked Omaha beach, the horror of war is ubiquitous for American soldiers who, as 
Schultz, "Citizen-soldiers and America's Army: Learning from the Past-Preparing for the Future," Army 
Times, 6 July 1998, p. 36. 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976; first pub. 1832),88-89. 
7 As Clausewitz noted, "As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a 
remarkable trinity .... The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander 
and his army; the third the government. The passions that are kindled in war must already be inherent in 
·the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance 
depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business 
of the government alone. These three tendencies are like three different codes oflaw, deep-rooted in their 
subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores anyone of them or seeks 
to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this 
reason alone it would be totally useless." Clausewitz, 89. 
8 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 1993), iv. Emphasis added. 
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members of Western civilization, must come to terms on a personal basis with what they 
have seen9 and what they have wrought. lo No other medium provides a milieu that lends 
such credence to the view that "war is hell" and that consequently one should find the 
most direct and expeditious path to victory. No other medium promotes such 
circumspection about starting war. No other warfare medium encourages such a state of 
inter arma silent leges (in war the laws are silent) as does land warfare. No other 
American service has produced as many practitioners of military realism than has the U.S. 
Army. By contrast, no other medium promotes such an appreciation of the relationship 
between strategy and ethical behavior as does war on land (perhaps this is the reason why 
Army and Marine Corps officers seem to appreciate this dimension of strategy more so 
than officers in the Navy or Air Forcell ). From a strategic perspective, failure to conduct 
9 As Stephen E. Ambrose noted: "What happens to men in combat is that they see their buddy 
with his brains oozing out of a hole in his head. It has not killed him, and he is begging for water and for a 
cigarette and for morphine simultaneously. They see a man trying to stuff his guts back into his stomach. 
They see a man carrying his left arm in his right hand. They see men who have lost their manhood to a 
piece of shrapnel. They see farm boys who have lost a leg. None of these people are dead. They all have to 
be dealt with. They have to be comforted, they have to have some kind of medical assistance, and they are 
there. If they all died the way they do in ... movies, war would be a lot less horrible than it is and there 
would be fewer atrocities." Stephen E. Ambrose, Americans at War (New York: Berkley, 1998), 193. 
10 As Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall stated: "The army cannot unmake [Western man]. It 
must reckon with the fact that he comes from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking 
of life, is prohibited and unacceptable. The teaching and ideals of that civilization are against killing, 
against taking advantage. The fear of aggression has been expressed to him so strongly and absorbed by 
him so deeply and prevadingly-practically with his mother's milk-that it is part of the normal man's 
emotional make-up. This is his greatest handicap when he enters combat. It stays his trigger-finger even 
though he is hardly conscious that it is a restraint upon him." S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New 
York: William Morrow, 1947), 136; quoted in John Keegan, The Illustrated Face of Battle: A Study of 
Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme (New York: Viking, 1976; illustrated reprint, 1988),63. 
II Because of the nature of hostilities at sea, navies can afford the luxury of following "civilized" 
rules. The nature of combat for navies tends to be characterized by fighting between large weapons systems 
at great distances (instead of with fellow humans at more discernable distances). Victory at sea tends to be 
one of absolutes. Enemy ships, submarines, and aircraft remain a threat until sent to the bottom. The 
flotsam of their demise will include fellow humans who are exhausted, traumatized, are at the mercy of their 
victors and, more importantly, cannot pose a threat to their captors' large platforms. Furthermore, unlike 
land warfare, the isolation of war at sea or from the sea tends to relieve sailors from moral dilemmas posed 
by the presence of noncombatants, terrorists, or guerilla soldiers. Three reasons may explain why Air Force 
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the war using appropriate means can threaten an entire military endeavor. Remembering 
the lessons of My Lai, Army officers are extremely sensitive to devising and following 
appropriate jus in bello l2and criteria parti~ularly when noncombatants are involved. 
As a result of these cultural tendencies, the Anny is more circumspect about 
committing to a large war. Its members are more risk-averse when contemplating options. 
They advocate strategies and a level of combat power that can effect quick and decisive 
victories to keep the level, of American casualties to a minimum, to avoid the possibility 
that society may tu~ against the war effort. At the same time, the Anny is sensitive to 
its soldiers' inappropriate behavior because these actions may have an adverse effect on 
their ability to win. 
Fourth, the Anny is more reluctant to commit itself to new concepts than the 
Navy and the Air Force. War at sea or in the air is more rapid and reactive than is war on 
land. The nature of combat for navies and air forces is one of a separated series of 
encounters characterized by meeting, fighting, and retiring. Because overly detailed orders 
officers may not be as interested in the relationship between strategy and ethical behavior. First, the nature 
of combat for air forces-fighting between weapons systems or dropping bombs at great heights-isolates 
its participants from the consequences of their actions. Second, when examining the U.S. Air Force and its 
raison d'etre, strategic bombing, the notion of humanness seems to conflate with institutional self-interest 
in the search for a decisive and casualty averse strategy to bring hostilities to a quick and successful 
conclusion. To its advocates, airpower promises to end wars quicker with less loss of life on both sides 
than more conventional land and sea military strategies. Third, and more importantly, the majority of 
Americans did not seem to mind the deaths of hundreds of thousands of German and Japanese 
noncombatants. Yet the political fallout in the aftermath of the raid on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad 
during Desert Storm (in which a large number ofIraqi civilians were killed along with a senior Iraqi 
security official and a third of his staff) that saw a curtailment of the strategic bombing campaign and less 
Air Force control over the target lists has made the Air Force and the Navy more aware of the effects of what 
is perceived to be unethical behavior upon the war effort. ' 
12 Jus ad bellum Gustice of war) concerns the conditions that make the use offorce permissible 
and is primarily a political responsibility. Jus in bello Gustice in war) concerns the rules governing how 
war should be conducted, and is largely a military responsibility. See Paul Christopher, The Ethics a/War 
and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), 1-16 
and 228. 
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and instructions, if adhered to, may limit an officer's ability to react in this dynamic 
environment, the Navy and Air Force do not have prescriptive operational doctrines. In 
contrast, an army cannot move-let alone fight-without detailed, ubiquitous doctrine 
that allows for coordination between units ranging in size from squads to corps, and in 
type from artillery, infantry, air defense, armor, and supply to aviation. 
The importance of doctrine to the Army cannot be overemphasized. Doctrine is a 
definitive guide for all units. 13 Doctrine is an approved, shared idea about the conduct of 
warfare that undergirds an army's pl~ing, organization, training, leadership, style, 
tactics, weapons, and equipment. Therefore, whether offensive or defensive, counter-
insurgent instead of conventional warfare, or maneuver versus attritional, the Army's 
prevailing war-fighting doctrine is itself a sociologically based ideational framework. Thus, 
if the Army finds itself embroiled in a war that it had not prepared for, it still has to fight 
using its existing doctrine, at least initially. Worse, its ideational framework may preclude 
it from recognizing that it needs to change its doctrine. As Jeffrey Legro noted: 
The u.s. Army had prepared for two decades before the Viet Nam war to 
carry out the '"Army Concept," which focused on the conventional 
deployment of massive mechanized fo"rmations that relied on firepower to 
avoid casualties. This it proceeded to do--unsuccessfully-in the jungles 
of Southeast Asia, against an unconventional enemy, in the face of 
13 There are different meanings of "doctrine" in the U.S. military. For the Army, doctrine is 
authoritative, but requires judgement in application. The Navy sees doctrine as a shared way of thinking 
that is not directive. In the Air Force, doctrine is the theoretical rationale behind the purpose of the Air 
Force. Marine Corps doctrine sets forth a way of thinking about war and strategy. It is more codification of 
its essence rather than a detailed body of knowledge to be consulted, even though in some aspects it is 
authoritative when discussing tactics. See Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, "Joint 
Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy" Joint Force Quarterly, no. 14 (Winter 1996--97): 94-100. 
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evidence that other methods, such as the Marine Corps' Combined Action 
Platoons, would be more effective. 14 
The possibility that it cannot recognize when change is required, and the possibility that 
it cannot change doctrine rapidly enough to secure a quick and decisive victory, means 
that the Army can ill-afford to prepare for the wrong kind of war. 
The terms of war for armies is almost invariably chosen by others-by political 
leaders or the enemy.IS Armies enjoy far less latitude of choice about how, where, and 
when they engage the enemy than do the more adaptive navies or air forces. Yet, the 
Army is expected to win quickly, decisively, and with little loss of life. As Korea and 
Vietnam demonstrated, if the Army has prepared for the wrong kind of war, its failures 
are likely to be bloodily apparent. They have much more serious consequences to the 
nation's security. J 6 Consequently, the Army is loathe to change its doctrine without 
extensive conceptual elaboration and discussion. General Gordon Sullivan, until recently 
the Army Chief of Staff, stated: "Too often in history, armies that close ranks around 
14 Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995),24. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army in Viet Nam 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), esp. 4-7, 172-177, and 258-268. This not mean that 
the Army has a history of doctrinal inflexibility. In the drive from the beaches ofN ormandy to the Rhine, 
for example, the Army encountered four very different environments-amphibious warfare on the beaches, 
offensive hedgerow fighting behind the beaches, attritional fighting in October 1944 in the Eifel Mountains 
and the rugged Ardennes and Hurtgen Forests, and urban fighting-for which it had little or no doctrine 
and was able to formulate effective tactical level doctrine in each. During this time, the Army also 
developed an extremely effective close air support doctrine. In only one campaign, the drive through France, 
did the Army actually encounter the environment for which was trained and equipped to fight. As Michael 
Doubler noted: "In its search for solutions to the difficulties of hedgerow combat, the American army 
encouraged the free flow of ideas and the entrepreneurial spirit. Coming from a wide variety of source, ideas 
generally flowed upward from the men actually engaged in combat." Michael E. Doubler, Closing with the 
Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994), 
58. 
15 Builder, The Masks of War, 91. 
16 Ibid., 133-134. 
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some sacred concept paid dearly with their lives of soldiers. We cannot afford to do 
that."17 Indeed, the U.S. Army has been the most aggressive of the services in examining 
the requirements for future warfare. IS Sullivan was one of the major proponents of 
carefully examining how the Army should move away from the Cold War orientation. As 
Chief of Staff, he consistently fostered an approach that avoided prematurely setting 
fixed doctrine or acquisition goals until a clearer picture of the future was available. 19 The 
conservative nature of the ,Army means that it may not be as able to exploit advanced 
technology as quickly as the other services. It means that there may be a capability gap 
between Army platforms and the rest of the services.2o Worse, it may mean that the 
Army spends too much time di:;cussing how it should change. The Army may, as a 
consequence, have to use doctrine left-over from the Cold War, at least in the initial stages 
of the next war. 
,Fifth, the Army has a balanced view of the role technology plays in strategy. The 
principal weapons system of the Army is not a mechanical platform that has a crew. It is 
17 Gordon Sullivan, "Doctrine: An Anny Update," in The United States Army: Challenges and 
Missionsfor the 1990s, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington, 1991), 85. 
18 Books on the Anny and the future environment outnumber those of the other services, These 
include: Pfaltzgraff and Schultz, eds., The United States Army; Douglas Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: 
A New Designfor Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997); Michael J. Mazarr, 
Light Forces & The Future of u.s. Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1990); William E. 
Odom, America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: 
American University Press, 1993); and The Downsized Warrior: America's Army in Transition (New 
York: New York University Press, 1998). 
. 19 Theodor W. Galdi, "Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational 
Responses, Outstanding Issues," [database on-line] (CRS Report for Congress, 30 November 1995); 
available from http://www.fas.orglman/crs/95-1170.htm; Internet; accessed 17 December 1997. 
20 In the Gulf War, for example, all U.S. aircraft were equipped with an electronic identification 
system called Mode IV that allowed U.S. surveillance platfonns to distinguish between friend or foe 
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a citizen-soldier who is anned. A ship is what defines a navy. An aircraft is what defines 
an air force. Yet the Anny is defined by a soldier who, alone, can seize and hold the 
territory that is instrumental for victory. Consequently, the Anny places more emphasis . 
on the individual soldier. Its places more emphasis on soldiers' combat skills than on the 
equipment they use. The Anny believes the human dimension of war to be more 
important than the technological dimension. As FM 100-5 states, wars are fought and 
won by soldiers, not machines.21 
Indeed, the Anny has stated that beside the human dimension, there may be other 
aspects of war that are more important than technology. The fonner versions ofFM 
100-5, for example, stated that terrain and weather have more impact on battle than any 
other physical factor, including weapons, equipment and supplies. "Terrain" as a word 
does not mean much to sailors or aviators. The seas tend to be all alike and the air 
certainly does not change much from area to area. To soldiers, however, terrain has a deep 
and intrinsic meaning. Terrain generally allows defense to be much stronger than the 
offense in land warfare. Indeed, it is not uncomm~m to see Anny officers "walking 
terrain" over old battlefields as part ofa strategy class. "Good" terrain can obviate one's 
technological advantage. 
Another reason why the Anny at times has a passive view of technology is 
because of its effect on doctrine. As technology improves so will the complexity of 
aircraft. In contrast, the Army resorted to painting inverted 'V's on the side of their vehicles to distinguish 
them from those of the enemy. 
21 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 1993), 14-3. 
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doctrine. The Anny may have a difficult time keeping doctrine from becoming too 
complex and detailed for a soldier-let alone a citizen-soldier-to grasp and use in 
combat. Given a combined arms approach, a change in the artillery's doctrine to take 
advantage of the Global Positioning System, for example, will require concomitant 
changes in the doctrines of the other members of the combined arms team. Technological 
advances also increase the natural tension between the need for authoritative operational 
doctrine and the need to keep that doctrine open to new ideas. 
The primacy of the human dimension in war means that the Army will be much 
more sensitive to the more human aspects of war and strategy, such as leadership, ethics, 
politics, and culture. Anny officers have a more holistic view of war and strategy than 
Navy and Air Force officers and will tend to be much more aware of factors that may 
influence war and strategy other than those related to technology or weapons systems. 
Sixth, Anny culture is imbued with a sense of teamwork and the need for 
integration. A newly-fledged lieutenant learns very quickly that one can make no 
movement without coordination. One cannot operate one's platoon without informing the 
platoons on one's right and left, one's company commander, the artillery, and the supply 
trains. Others depend on the lieutenant following their direction and the lieutenant 
depends upon them for support. Consequently, one's unit has very little independent 
discretion within the larger battlespace.22 (This does not change as a soldier becomes more 
senior. A major general in charge of a division has less autonomy than a Navy commander 
22 James M. Smith, "Service Cultures, Joint Cultures, and the US Military," Airman-Scholar 4, 
no. 1 (Winter 1998): 6. 
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in command of a ship.). The need for teamwork facilitates interaction between branches. 
Each of the branches consequently has a grasp of how the other branches operate.23 
Because of its size, however, the Army is dependent on the Navy for transportation and 
the Air Force for transportation and air cover. Indeed, soldiers cannot conceive of a battle 
context that is not interdependent.24 
Because it is imbued with a sense of teamwork and the need for integration, the 
Army is uncomfortable ~th situations that lack such attributes. Because it sees a lack of 
teamwork and integration as problems that need fixing, the Army welcomes and advocates 
changes that further integrate the military, such as joint operational doctrine and defense 
reorganization acts. The focus .on coordination and interdependence between units and 
services also fosters a team approach to the Army's strategizing. The Army is more 
inclined to develop plans that integrate the other services . 
. Seventh, Army culture is conducive to producing superb strategists. Army 
officers recognize the significance ofClausewitz's remarkable trinity-the government, 
the army, and the people. They recognize that Americans' aversion to wartime casualties 
and their perception that land wars risk high casualty rates mean that employing the 
23 That there is comparatively little animosity between the Army's branches maybe because of 
their interaction. While infantry tends to hold court, there is an absence of an extensive, fine-structured, 
hierarchical pecking order from top to bottom that is characteristic of Navy and Air Force cultures. Builder 
remark that: "The Army branches of infantry, artillery, and armor each see themselves as inextricably 
dependent upon their brother branches if they are to wage war effectively .... While each branch is proud of 
its unique skills and contribution, there is seldom any hint of dominance, or independence from its 
brotpers" is equally applicable to the Marine Corps. Builder, The Masks o/War, 27.The emphasis 
knowing how the other branches think may explain why Army and Marine officers tend to be much more 
aware of the cultural tendencies of their services and those of the other services than members of any other 
service. 
24 Army officers may arguably be the best joint officers because they can define their place on a 
multi-service team and act accordingly. Smith, "Service Cultures, Joint Cultures, and the US Military," 6. 
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Army overseas in almost any capacity is a highly political undertaking and underscores 
the need to be circumspect, given the high level of commitment that that endeavor entails. 
They recognize that the goals of war on land are intimately related to the conflict's 
political objectives. The primary reason why the Army produces superb strategists may 
be because of the nature of land warfare. 
In combat, the Army has to rely not only on doctrine, but also on detailed plans. 
Such plans are required to define and coordinate the objectives and actions of large 
numbers of disparate forces. The Army has to specify the goals and coordinate the 
actions for every unit, from squad to corps. It has to integrate plans among artillery, 
infantry, air defense, armor, supply, and aviation units. This need for a priori knowledge 
reduces war's friction by imparting an understanding throughout the chain of command 
about the rationale behind plans, including the commander's intention. 
The need to coordinate the courses of action of almost every unit resulted in the 
ubiquitous presence of staff and staff schools. At every level of command above 
company level, the staff examines its objectives as defined by its immediately senior staff, 
examines different courses of action according to the strengths and weaknesses of its 
resources, and develops the objectives and the coordination plans of each of its units. For 
example, a company commander in the Army examines the goals his battalion staffhas set 
for his unit, develops a plan that assigns attainable goals for each of his platoon officers 
using the resources at his disposal, and then executes his plan. Army officers 
consequently have a keen understanding of the vertical interrelationships between the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the expertise of their respective 
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horizontallevel.25 Moreover, Army officers rotate between command billets, staff 
assignments, and staff schools. Consequently, Army officers, regardless of their rank, are 
almost constantly engaged in e dialectic between means, ways, and ends that is the core of 
strategizing. 
Army culture promotes such traits as obedience to the people and government, 
sensitivity to the views of society, a sense of circumspection, and keen strategy skills. 
Political leaders and civilian defense officials recognize these strategic skills of Army 
generals and have come to rely on them for balanced and cogent strategic advice. More so 
than the flag officers of other services, Army generals have traditionally been major . 
contributors to the formulation of national strategy and national military strategy.26 
Army generals have traditionally occupied many of the more important strategy posts in 
the military (Chairman of the Joint Staff and the director for Strategic Plans and Policy on 
the Joint Staff, for example) and in the executive branch. Since one's perceptions ~e 
influenced by culture, the influence of Army culture on a more joint and unified military is 
ubiquitous. Indeed, attempts for increased unification and integration under a more 
centralized command structure' have been at the behest of former Army officers such as 
Presidents Truman (National Security Act of 1947) and Eisenhower (Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958), and Congressman Nichols (Goldwater-Nichols Department 
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986). Joint operational doctrine, for example, is 
25 Battalion and brigade staffs tend to confine their activities to the tactical level. Division staff 
officers focus primarily on the tactical and operational level while corps and higher will focus primarily on 
factors within the operational and strategic levels, 
26 Builder, The Masks of War, 86. 
52 
detailed and prescriptive. By contrast, the doctrines of the Navy and Air Force are loose 
and descriptive. Joint commands reflect the hierarchical and centralized command 
structures of the Army and not the highly decentralized structures of the Navy. To admit, 
that the joint world is more reflective of Army culture is, however, not to admit failure in 
any way. Indeed, the Army's sense of teamwork has facilitated more "jointness' than 
many observers had thought possible. 
Perhaps because it is highly reflective of American society's values and beliefs, 
Army culture is the most straightforward and open of the military's cultures. It has also 
engendered characteristics that should make it easier for the Army to create sensible and 
realistic approaches to its strategic problems and the strategic problems of the nation. 
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V. U.S. NAVY 
Most Americans have pever been to sea on a ship or outside the sight of land. 
They have little experience about things maritime.! The lack of firsthand knowledge about 
the sea results in broad ignorance in society about the Navy, the worth of a navy, and 
naval strategy.2 It explains why the Navy is the most misunderstood ofthe American 
services, why it remains an enigma to Americans, and why officers ofthe other U.S. 
services tend to dismiss aspects of its culture as aberrant. The lack of firsthand knowledge 
of operations at sea engenders an opinion in the defense community that, as Henry 
Stimson noted, the Navy "frequently seem[s] to retire from the realm oflogic into a dim 
and religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet and the United States 
.Navy the only true church."3 From a land warfare perspecth.:e, naval operations are a 
"dim" world.4 The important point of this chapter may not be how aspects of Navy 
I Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, "Introduction," in Sea power and Strategy, ed. Colin S. 
Gray and Roger W. Barnett (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1989), ix-xiv. 
2 The lack of firsthand knowledge of the sea explains why most prominent strategists wrote only 
about land warfare. It explains why they were completely unaware of the difference between sea and land 
warfare. That the world has witnessed far fewer giants when it comes to strategizing about seapower than 
land power may explain why the U.S. Navy holds Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett in such high 
esteem. While he understood Army and Air Force cultures, the lack of firsthand knowledge may explain 
why Carl H. Builder in The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) failed to understand Navy culture (and naval strategy) beyond its 
more observable traits. Because of Builder's inability to comprehend the Navy in the context of naval 
operations and his refusal to admit that the Marine Corps has a "significant voice" in the U.S. strategy-
making process, The Masks of War remains an excellent though incomplete study. 
3 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: 
Harper, 1947), 506. 
4 As Gray noted: "The geophysical character of an environment has profound implications for the 
nature and military operational purposes of conflict, for the military means suitable for combat, for tactics, 
and-fundamentally-for the perspectives of combatants. Some of the differences between war at sea and war 
on land are so obvious that they have a way of functioning as a barrier to achievement of a deeper 
comprehension of the individuality of the two environments. Strategically speaking ... more often than not 
navies and armies have represented two reasonably distinct "cultures," whose mutual comprehension has 
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culture might affect the American strategy-making process. Rather, it may be its 
suggestion that navies are fundamentally different than land forces. The perspectives of 
sailors are different than those of soldiers or Marines. Consequently, one should not judge 
the Navy or try to make sense of naval strategy from a land-warfare perspective. It is 
possible to understand six characteristics of Navy culture found only in the context of 
navies, as they function in all their complexity and mystery.5 
First, the Navy believes that it alone understands how to plan and execute naval 
strategy. Because of the Army's sense of obedience to the nation, the direct relationship 
between a conflict's political goals and land warfare, and the comparatively higher 
potential for casualties that is characteristic of land warfare, the Army accepts, and in 
some cases invites, debates by politicians, statesmen, and the citizenry on the merits of 
its strategies. The Navy, however, does not invite this kind of commentary. From a naval 
officer's perspective, civilian and non-naval military leaders and Americans understand 
land warfare and, to a lesser extent, air warfare; but they have a difficult time grasping the 
nature of sea warfare and specifically that it is ashore that their naval power is most 
influentia1.6 For example, John Mearsheimer argued that: 
left much to be desired." Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Stratecraftfor the Next 
Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 62. 
5 David Alan Rosenberg, "Process: The Realities of Formulating Modem Naval Strategy," in 
Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral 
Sir Herbert Richmond, ed. James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War 
College Press, 1993), 173. . 
6 Regarding naval strategy, Admiral Arleigh Burke remarked that: "The Navy is very much in the 
same position with regard to public relations as a virtuous woman. Virtue seldom is spectacular and less 
often causes long editorials. Naval philosophy and maritime strategy are not spectacular. They offer no 
panaceas. Their success depends upon long, dull hours of hard work in which no one action is clearly 
decisive by itself. Its final success depends upon a series of small successes." Arleigh Burke to Robert 
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Insular powers like the United States can do little with independent naval 
forces to hurt a land power like the Soviet Union. This point was 
demonstrated in both world wars, when Britain's Navy had little effect on 
Germany's ability to wage war. To the extent that there was an impact, it 
involved the much over-rated naval blockade of World War 1.7 
Mearsheimer's error in not understanding the intangible yet decisive impact that 
navies can have on the war effort is common among American strategists.8 Such ignorance 
is captured in the argument that the United States no longer needs a blue-water navy 
because the SovietlRussian navy no longer poses a threat. By definition, since people live 
on land, the effect of seapower on the course and outcome of war can only be indirect. 
Indirect, however, does not necessarily mean secondary or indecisive.9 Indeed, the 
intended instrument of victory in war for Germany in 1917 and again in late 1942 and 
early 1943 was the U-boat. The Navy believes that the most important issue in strategy 
is the strategic relationship between seapower and land power. As the major wars of . 
modem history all have illustrated, the power or coalition preponderant at sea has 
enjoyed a critical advantage in strategic and operational flexibility.lO Britain's foremost 
Dennison, 6 August 1952, Personal File, Arleigh Burke Papers, Operational Archives, Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, D.C.; quoted in David Alan Rosenberg, "Process," 144. 
7 John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," 
International Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 33-34; quoted in Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, 183. 
8 No less a superb strategist than General George Marshall had difficulties in understanding how 
navies operate. Thomas Buell recounted an incident during World War II when General George Marshall, 
the Anny Chief of Staff, was arguing with Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander 
in Chief of the U.S. Fleet. Marshall stated that General Douglas MacArthur, Southwest Pacific 
Commander, should control fleet movements in his' own area. Buell remarked that: "Marshall left his 
element and began foundering in uncharted waters .... [Marshall's] ignorance of naval communication 
procedures, for example, was glaringly exposed in a memorandum to King. 'His basic trouble,' King said 
later, 'was that like all Anny officers he knew nothing about sea power and very little about air power'." 
Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1980),216-217. 
9 Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, 63. 
10 Ibid., 67. 
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soldier, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, noted: "From the days when we humans 
first began to use the seas, the great lesson of history is that the enemy who is confined to 
a land strategy is in the end defeated."11 The Field Marshal did not claim that sea powers 
eventually succeed in wars against land powers; rather, he argued that powers "confined 
to a land'strategy" eventually lose.12 The Navy believes that non-navy strategists neither 
appreciate nor possess enough knowledge of the relationship between seapower and land 
power to be trusted with the responsibility of planning and executing naval strategies. 
As a result of its belief that only sailors should plan and execute naval strategy, 
Navy officers are reluctant to have representatives from other services develop naval 
campaign strategies, let alone execute such plans. While it does develop contingency 
plans, the Navy does not collectively codify them as doctrine for fear that their decision-
making prerogatives will be appropriated by leaders in Washington. In marked contrast to 
the Army and Air Force, the Navy is reluctant to go outside its ranks and let American 
defense intellectuals develop and articulate assumptions and strategic concepts for the 
Navy.13 Because of a lack of firsthand knowledge of how navies operate and because 
some influential aspects of American culture are antithetical to the precepts of naval 
strategy (such as impatience and the desire to return to, normalcy as soon as possible by 
advocating a direct approach to ensure quick and decisive victories), the Navy develops 
II Peter Gretton, Maritime Strategy: A Study of Defense Problems (New York: Praeger, 1965), 
213; quoted in Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, 67. 
12 Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, 67. 
13 Rosenberg, "Process," 173. 
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and attempts to sell naval strategies and policies directly to the public in clear, 
demonstrative, and impassioned language, thereby bypassing the defense establishment. 14 
Second, the Navy views itself as the nation's predominant military and foreign 
policy instrument. Before 1890, few Americans saw the United States as a maritime 
nation dependent for its security and its prosperity on control of the sea approaches or 
that the country needed an offensive fleet. They had been satisfied with a small navy 
whose missions included commerce raiding and coastal defense. Before 1890, the Navy 
had identified its welfare with the country's economy.15 However, with the publishing in 
1890 of Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 
the Navy began to identify itself less as the government's instrument and more as the 
guarantor of national greatness. 16 In a milieu of hortatory nationalism, imperialism, and 
social Darwinism, realignments in the international security environment, and two 
decisive actions in the Spanish-American War (1898), the Navy shed its traditional role of 
coastal defense and commerce raiding by the turn of the century and donned the colorful 
raiment of a blue-water navy that had midwifedt~e United States as a great power. The 
14 Because they tend not to understand the tenets of naval strategy and how navies can impact the 
struggle on land, defense analysts and officers from other services will be unable to understand the merits of 
naval strategies such as the Maritime Strategy. They will consequently dismiss such naval strategies 
stating that they serve the Navy more than the country. For example, Builder noted: "An analysis of the 
content of the maritime strategy suggests that it is a carefully woven fabric of substrategies that more clearly 
serves the Navy's institutional interests in rationalizing its existing force mix than it does the u.s. 
national strategy or security interests." Builder, The Masks of War, 85. Since rationality is inherently 
conditioned by culture, all of the services' strategies and weapons programs-including those of the 
Army-will inherently be self-serving to some degree. 
15 Kenneth 1. Hagan, American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889 (Westport: 
Greenwood, 1973), 8-9. 
16 As Kenneth Allard noted: "The writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan gave the U.S. Navy a 
strategic vision of itself and its role in the nation's defense so profound that it deserves to be called a 
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Navy still views itself as the guarantor of America's international status. In the eyes of 
sailors, the Navy is the most important and flexible kind of military power for the United 
States. It is the predominant instrument of American foreign policy in peacetime. 
Because they believe that American strategists do not know how to wield 
seapower or appreciate the worth of a large navy and its connection with keeping 
America a great nation, Navy officers defer grudgingly to civilian authorities and non-
naval military leaders. The Navy may become obstinate and resist authority when it 
believes the defense establishment, the President, or Congress are advocating policies or 
strategies that are not in accord with the Navy's view of the national interests. 
Third, the Navy seeks to maintain internally balanced, multi-purpose forces and 
advocates strategically and tactically offensive strategies. The air, surface, and submarine 
communities compete with each other for funding and prominence within the Navy.17 
While the competition between the communities at times is contentious, Navy officers do 
not believe that any of the communities is expendable or that anyone can completely 
paradigm." C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990),64-65. 
17 The Navy's highly parochial subcultures are so different that they function as a barrier for Navy 
officers to gain a deeper understanding of Navy culture. While Navy culture is perhaps the most accreted and 
entrenched of the services' cultures, many junior Navy officers believe that "Navy" culture is little more 
than a summation of the subcultures of the aviation, surface, and submarine communities. Navy officers, 
. more so than officers of other services, have a difficult time discerning characteristics of their own service's 
culture. Despite the divergent nature of the subcultures and the lack of interaction between the communities, 
Navy officers-although many do not realize it-share an institutional mind-set that is more acculturated 
than those ofthe other services with the possible exception of the Marines' mind-set. For an superb, ifnot 
spirited, study on how the struggle between the communities has shaped the Navy since World War II, see 
Roger Thompson, Brown Shoes, Black Shoes and Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution of the 
Post-War u.s. Navy, Center for Naval Warfare Studies Strategic Research Department Research Report 
5-95 (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College Press, 1995). 
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dominate the others. 18 Consequently, the Navy does not seek a Mahanian fleet based on a 
capital ship. It seeks to maintain a balanced, multi-purpose fleet that is capable of 
pursuing a wider variety of objectives than a fleet centered solely on battleships or 
aircraft carriers. The strategies the Navy advocates stress the inherent characteristics of a 
more balanced Navy such as mobility, flexibility, and adaptability. They emphasize 
endurance on station, a noncommitting continuous presence overseas, and the ability to 
move the strategic frontie~ close to the enemy's coastline thereby keeping the enemy on 
the defensive. Thes~ strategies stress power projection but not at the expense of 
establishing and maintaining sea-control. 
The Navy views sea-control as the central issue in naval warfare. It trains its. 
sailors, builds ships, and develops strategies to effect the first objective of naval 
operations as deduced by Mahan and Julian Corbett: 19 deny the enemy's use of the seas 
18 David Alan Rosenberg, "American Naval Strategy in the Era of the Third World War: An 
Inquiryin the Structure and Process of General War at Sea, 1945-90," in Naval Power in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. N.A.M. Rodger (New York: Macmillan, 1996),245. In a discussion contrasting the question 
and implications of leadership interests in the Air Force with that in the Navy, Builder noted: "The 
wrestling over the leadership by the carrier aviators, the submariners, and the surface warfare specialists is 
appropriate: It is about where the future of the Navy lies and, therefore, whose perspective should most 
influence the future evolution of the Navy. The resolution of that leadership does not mean that the other 
dimensions of naval power will disappear. Indeed, the Navy leadership-whatever its special 
interests-will be responsible, as it has in the past, for integrating all elements of the Navy, from carrier 
aviation to mine warfare, into concepts of naval power and its mission." Builder remarked that the "The 
Navy mine warfare specialist who is near the bottom of the Navy's exquisite hierarchy, sees his 
contribution in terms of naval power, not in terms of serving the carrier elites. Moreover, the mine warfare 
specialist is not excluded from leadership of the Navy because he has chosen the wrong specialty, but 
because of how his specialty is perceived throughout the institution to relate to naval power. If the 
perception of the importance of mine warfare to naval power changes, so do his chances of participating in 
Navy leadership." Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution 
and Fate of the u.s. Air Force (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994),226-228. 
19 As Herbert Rosinski noted: "At sea ... all the conditions that on land tend to strengthen the 
defense vis-a-vis the attack are absent. No common frontier enables the defender to establish and maintain 
contact; no accidents of ground help to canalise his opponent's advance into predictable lines, nor support 
him in making his stand." Herbert Rosinski, "Mahan in World War II: A Commentary from the United 
States," in The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, B. Mitchell Simpson III 
(Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College Press, 1977),23-24; quoted in Gray and Barnett, xi. 
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by destroying their fleet. Consequently, those means of warfare that are compatible with 
offensive sea control and are more multi-purpose-such as aircraft carriers, nucIear-
powered attack submarines (as opposed to diesel powered submarines), and guided-
missile destroyers-are advocated by the Navy. There is little advocacy for ballistic-
missile submarines20 and mine warfare platforms that may have a deleterious effect on the 
ability of the Navy to fund offensive sea-control platforms. 
Fourth, the Navy e!llphasizes deploying its forces at sea and developing strategies 
based on actual operational experience.21 Beginning in the Second World War, the U.S. 
Navy developed a strong operational orientation. Continuous overseas deployments 
begun after the war were institutionalized in the 1950s and became the standard operating 
pattern of the American navy.22 The operational orientation has profoundly shaped Navy 
culture.23 The primacy of operations means that Navy offi"cers do not stray far from the' 
20 Even as the Navy began to realize how the Polaris system might finally lift the Navy out of its 
financial woes of the 1950s, the majority of Navy admirals and officers were hard-set against the project. 
They realized that Polaris would grow at the expense of particularly aircraft carriers. Hopes that the 
Department of Defense would carry the Polaris-submarine project as a national program and fund it outside 
the Navy budget came to nothing. Amidst battles within the Navy, Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of 
Naval Operations, had to convince many admirals of the merits of the program. As a result of the program's 
acceptance, the idea of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier had to be scuttled. Top technical personnel were 
siphoned off to Polaris. Development of other systems, such as naval guns, was stopped, and so was 
growth in the number of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and attack submarines. See George W. Baer, One 
Hundred Years o/Sea Power: The Us. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 
352-362 and Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1972),61-229. 
21 Rosenberg, "American Naval Strategy," 245. 
22 Rosenberg, "Process," 155. 
23 This orientation is so strong that many sailors believe that operating at sea is the Navy's 
raison d'etre. As Admiral King stated: "The be-all and end-all of the [Navy] is the conduct of active 
operations by the active seagoing forces." Buell, 236. One of the highest compliments a Navy officer can 
receive is to be referred to as an "bperator." 
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operational side of the Navy and their warfare specialties during their shore tours for fear 
of receiving poor evaluations. 
The technical demands of service at sea also mean that the shore tours of most 
officers consist of either technical schools or technical, budget, or manpower-oriented 
program offices. There is little room in a Navy officer's career path to study the finer 
points of naval history and naval strategy. Navy officers consequently acquire an 
understanding of naval strategy based on their operational experiences. They approach 
strategy not from a theoretical or his~orical perspective, but from their own narrow 
operational experience.24 
As a consequence of its operational mind-set, the Navy's strategies are based on 
current capabilities and actual operational experience. As David Alan Rosenberg stated: 
"The beating heart of the Maritime Strategy was the exploitation of both existing forces 
and technological innovation in an operational context."25 Even though they represent a 
shift away from open-ocean warfighting, "From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea" 
24 Rosenberg, "Process," 153. The primacy of operations and the concomitant narrow and 
operationally oriented career paths of Navy officers means many Navy flag officers come late to the more 
sublime aspects of their profession. While they have an deep, intuitive sense of the relationship between 
seapower and land power, flag officers are generally unversed in political-military affairs and how to plan 
strategically in the context of national military strategy. They rely on a small cadre of political-military 
experts for advice and to develop strategic documents such as "From the Sea." Rosenberg noted that few of 
the Navy's political-military experts during the Cold War "Reached flank rank; fewer still achieved three or 
four stars. Further, only a minority of the service's top echelon leaders in Washington, Norfolk, London, 
Naples, or Pearl Harbor were [naval] war college graduates (in contrast with all but one of the navy's 
admirals in 1941), much less trained in international relations at civilian institutions." Rosenberg, 
"Process," 152. It is interesting that the Army, unlike the Navy, does not see the need for officers who are 
specifically trained as strategists. These Navy officers are assigned to strategic billets by virtue of their 
graduate degrees in areas such as strategic or area studies, political science, or international relations from 
civilian or military universities; assignments to staff colleges, or previous tours in such billets. 
25 Rosenberg, "American Naval Strategy," 248. 
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also are strategies based on traditional operational capabilities of forward deployment, 
strategic deterrence, crises response and control, and power projection. 
Another consequence of the operational mind-set, as Rosenberg suggested, is that 
the Navy approaches technological innovation from an operational perspective. Between 
the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s, the Navy underwent profound technological changes. 
Nuclear-attack' and ballistic-missile submarines and at least three generations of carrier 
aircraft joined the fleet. The Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) was laid. Helicopter 
technology matured and became involved in logistics and anti-submarine and mine-warfare 
roles. Surface-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-ground, land-attack, and antiship missiles became 
operational. Space-based electronic warfare and intelligence systems became an integral 
part of naval operations.26 
Yet as comfortable as it is with technology, the Navy does not view it as a means 
of revolutionizing naval warfare or as a panacea. Navy officers spend their careers learning 
how operate technology in an operational environment and consequently view 
technological innovation in an operational context.27 Advanced technology is a means to 
improvin existing capabilities within the context of current naval operations. Those 
technologies that are seen to improve the ability of the Navy to operate, such as ballistic 
26 Rosenberg, "Process," 155-156. 
27 Among the U.S. services, the Navy most readily accepted the interpretation that the Gulf War 
should not be viewed as a model for the future. In the view of the Navy, its roles in the war-sea control 
(including the enforcing the embargo and securing the flanks of the peninsula), tactical air strikes, 
amphibious operations, transport, supply-and its ability to operate without foreign bases are fundamental 
characteristics of the u.s. sea services and were greater (though intangible and less visible) determinants of 
ultimate victory than the war's alleged revolutionary aspects. As Rosenberg noted: "Naval strategy, as 
understood by naval officers, may consist not so much in overarching, erudite theories as in day by day 
policy and program choices, backed up by thorough training and experience in operations and tactics, and 
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missile defense, and effect offensive sea control, such as nuclear propulsion, are 
welcomed, while those that threaten traditional operations (e.g., nuclear weapons28) are 
viewed more equivocally. 
Fifth, the Navy is reluctant to centralize command structures or develop detailed 
operational doctrine. Viewed by a Navy officer, war on land is systemic and linear. It 
stresses coordinated timetables and the need for a lock-step mentality. It moves ahead in 
lines parallel to the front which will ensure a safe rear area. It involves the use of concepts 
such as limits of advance, phase lines, coordinating points, contact points, restrictive fire 
lines, and "on-order" missions .. War on land is inwardly focused. It emphasizes the need 
of soldiers to be in the designated place, in the proper sequence, and at the prescribed 
time in relation to other friendly units.29 Coordination is achieved through careful 
planning, a hierarchical delegation of authority, and doctrine. Doctrine for armies is 
therefore inherently prescriptive. It is a series of recipes that tells commanders what to do 
with the force of an order. From this perspective, a commander has little latitude. Indeed, 
commanders and their units are evaluated on how closely they follow their doctrine.3o 
The nature of operating at sea lends a much different persp'ective. 
by a modem, multi-faceted fleet capable of swift deployment and effective employment." Rosenberg, 
"Process," 144. 
28 As Rosenberg noted: "Most naval officers ... saw [nuclear] weapons as a presumably necessary 
evil, surrounded by a vast array of burdensome and stringent custodial and safety requirements. There were 
few navy precepts on tactical and theater nuclear warfare comparable to the army's extensive atomic 
operations field manuals and planning doctrine." Rosenberg, "Process," 154. 
29 Terry C. Pierce, "Teaching Elephants to Swim," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 
1998): 27. 
30 Ibid., 29. 
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Sea warfare is more rapid and reactive than land warfare. Naval warfare is 
inherently maneuver warfare. It is inherently non-linear; that is, without well-defined 
forward and rear areas and therefore no safe areas. In such an environment, coordination 
cannot be achieved by plans, a hierarchical command structure, or prescriptive doctrine. 
Combat effectiveness depends on a decentralized command structure and considerable 
delegation of individual responsibility. Prescriptive doctrine, if adhered to, would restrict 
the ability of commanders to fight in such a dynamic environment. Like the Marine 
Corps, the Navy's understanding of,doctrine is therefore not prescriptive in nature. It is 
descriptive. It sees operational doctrine as intuitive shared concepts that shape thinking 
but do not dictate how one should react in the chaotic sea environment. Navy operational 
doctrine imparts judgment by using a when-necessary, fleet-driven approach rather than 
an always-required, top-down philosophy. 
Because of its tendencies towards decentralization, the Navy resists efforts by 
U.S. political leaders to centralize the military's command structure. During the Civil 
War, for example, the Navy resisted the efforts of Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War, to 
appropriate the Navy as an adjunct ofthe Army. After the Second World War, the Navy 
unsuccessfully tried to thwart the efforts of President Truman to unify the services in the 
National Security Act of 1947. In 1958, the Navy tried to block Eisenhower's efforts to 
shorn the Navy of operational control over its forces and administrative responsibility for 
force planning and programming. In 1986, the Navy resisted Goldwater-Nichols and its 
goal of further centralization. Put simply, no senior Navy leader thinks a central non-
Navy authority-regardless of whether a uniformed officer or a civilian with a large 
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staff--can understand seapower sufficiently to direct naval operations or run a Navy 
whose culture and mode of warfare dictate the need for decentralization and delegation of 
individual responsibility. 31 
Cultural inhibitions against centralization also affect how the Navy approaches 
information technologies. As James FitzSimonds noted, although wireless equipment was 
made readily available to the Navy, it saw little operational use for nearly two decades.32 
In the view of Navy offic~rs, the operational advantages of radio were outweighed by the 
reduction of individ~al authority. A high degree of centralized control that wireless 
offered threatened to interfere with the actions of commanders accustomed to virtual 
independence. Since the Navy began to make operational use of wireless on the eve of the 
First World War, command authority has indeed gravitated upward. Despite introduction 
of contemporary computer-to-computer tactical data links and satellite communication, 
commanding officers have retained much of their independence. When one examines the . 
implications of pervasive high speed information exchange made possible by the 
technologies of an information-led RMA, however, the transition to network warfare33 
31 Baer, 369. As Admiral Arleigh Burke wrote: "Decentralization means we offer officers the 
opportunity to rise to positions of responsibilitY, of decision, of identity and stature-if they want it, and 
as soon as they can take it. We believe in command, not staff. We believe we have "real" things to do .... 
We decentralize and capitalize on the capabilities of our individual people rather than centralize and make 
automatons of them. This builds that essential pride of service and sense of accomplishment. If it results in 
a certain amount of cockiness, I am for it. But this is the direction in which we should move." Burke to 
Rear Admiral Walter G. Schindler, 14 May 1958; quoted in David Alan Rosenberg, "Arleigh Albert 
Burke, 17 August 1955-1 August 1961," in The Chiefs of Naval Operations, ed. Robert William Love, 
Jr. (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1980),287. 
32 James R. FitzSimonds, "The Cultural Challenge ofInforrnation Technology," Naval War 
College Review 51, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 11. 
33 For a description of the Navy's concept on network warfare, see Arthur K. Cebrowski and John 
J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 
1998): 28-35. 
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may be prolonged and may have to rely on the determined efforts of a few key individuals 
as in the case of the transition to wireless. 
Much like its institutional dislike for centralized command, the Navy is reluctant 
to develop detailed joint operational doctrine. To Navy officers, unified doctrine means 
one accepted style of doctrine-the methodical, plodding, and command-limiting doctrine 
of land warfare. Because it shies away from articulating its own operational doctrine, 
Navy doctrine has evolve~ much like the British Constitution-largely unwritten but 
thoroughly understood by its practitioners.34 Indeed, describing sea warfare to those 
lacking firsthand knowledge may be problematical. Because of a lack of written doctrine, 
however, the Navy has failed t9 articulate and defend the differences between warfare at 
sea and warfare on land. Army and Air Force officers consequently have a difficult time 
understanding that sea warfare is different, let alone understanding how it differs. Unless 
the Nav.y makes the effort to describe its style of fighting in a joint doctrinal context, joint 
operational doctrine will remain highly reflective only of Army doctrine. 
The Navy is the most difficult of the services to understand. The nature of 
warfare at sea has engendered characteristics that make it difficult for the Navy to 
integrate itself into a more interdependent military. The inability of others to realize that 
the mind-set of sailors is different than those of soldiers, however, has further isolated a 
navy that has little physical contact with the rest of the military. The inability to 
und~rstand how sea warfare differs from land warfare ris~s not exploiting the potential of 
the world's most powerful navy and not realizing the full potential of joint integration. 
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To say that the Army produces superb strategists is not to imply that the Navy does 
not. The Navy produces outstanding naval strategists. To accept this realization is to 
begin to view American strategy in a more holistic manner. 
Regardless of their difficulties in adapting to a more joint military or of their 
difficulty in articulating and defending the differences between the principles of warfare at 
sea and warfare on land, or even of the challenges of moving away from open-ocean 
warfighting, sailors deployed for up to six months off the world's coastlines remain 
confident in the knowledge that while few understand the need for a navy, the nation's 
leaders will in the near future ask the question, "Where are the carriers?" and will again 
rely heavily on the navy's operational abilities, its overseas presence, and the ability of a 
carrier battlegroup to deliver in unambiguous terms the nation's intentions and resolve. 
34 Pierce, 26. 
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VI. U.S. AIR FORCE 
Air Force culture lacks the cohesion that is characteristic of the other services' 
cultures. It does not have two or three centuries of accrued experiences. Indeed, the 
existence of the Air Force spans only two generations. The struggle to establish an 
independent American air service only goes back as far as three generations. Mere time, 
however, may not be the only reason why Air Force culture lacks cohesion. 
Like modem corporations, the Air Force is characterized by a high-technology, 
multiple-subculture organization. Because of the wing concept and the nature of Air Force 
operations, there is little interaction among its fighter, bomber, tanker, reconnaissance, 
theater airlift, global airlift, and ballistic-missile communities. Because of this isolation, 
each of these communities has its own highly developed culture. Support personnel, 
removed from the flightline and silo, are closely integrated with civilian ~pecialists and 
tend to identify themselves more by their occupational identifications than by their 
affiliation with the Air Force. Air Force technological research-and-development units are 
virtually indistinguishable from civilian research-and-development institutions.) 
Soldiers are bound together by a loyalty to their nation and profession of arms; 
sailors share the romanticism of the sea and an allegiance to a tradition-rich institution; 
and Marines are loyal to each other and to the Corps. What holds (or what is supposed to 
hold) Air Force officers and their subcultures together is a service-oriented concept to 
) Franklin D. Margiotta, "Changing Military Manpower Realities: Implications for the Next 
Decade," in Changing u.s. Military Manpower Realities, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta, James Brown, and 
Michael J. Collins (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1983),22-24. 
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effect airpower.2 Without the benefits of time-rendered maturity or a less sublime 
institutional linchpin, the Air Force may be susceptible to institutional maladies such as 
occupationalism and community nepotism. The Air Force is more like a modern 
corporation than a military institution. Its institutional problems are similar to those 
found in large corporations. 
The Air Force is a different kind of military institution. By its very nature, the Air 
Force has to expend more energy than the other services to develop and sell a cogent and 
unifying vision of itself to maintain institutional cohesion and remain an effective military 
organization. Consequently, one should not judge the Air Force from the perspective of 
how a "military institution" is supposed to behave based on the other, older services. 
Indeed, the forefathers of the Air Force defined their service and their careers against 
Army tradition. It is therefore possible to identify as least six characteristics of Air Force 
culture that reflect air operations and the need for a strong unifying vision. 
First, the Air Force is still plagued by paranoia about its survival as a service even 
after most sensible people have long accepted the strategic utility of airpower.3 The origin 
of this demon lies in the Air Force's long and difficult struggle for independence. The lack 
of evidence on the efficacy of airpower during the First World War and the inability to 
demonstrate its worth during the interwar period drove the airmen to talk about airpower 
2 For recent studies on the unifying role ofairpower in the Air Forces, see Carl H. Builder, The 
Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the u.s. Air Force (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994) and Mike Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air 
Force Leadership, 1945-1982 (Maxwell, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998). 
3 James Mowbray noted that the Air Force's paranoia is virtually a "sacred legacy of the service." 
James A. Mowbray, "Air Force Doctrine Problems: I 926-Present," Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 
1995): 41 (note 127). 
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I 
in tenns of promise and prophecy. The early advocates took their proselytizing to the 
public in hope offorcing the Anny to acquiesce to the wishes of the air advocates and 
establish a separate air service. Will Rogers became an early advocate and voice for 
airpower. His statements reflect the attitudes of ainnan that have persisted. He stated 
that: "When we lose the next war, as we probably will, we can lay it onto one thing-the 
jealously of the army and navy towards aviation. They have belittled it since it started and 
will keep on doing it .... "4 .One can understand how decades of striving for a theory in 
such a jeremiad environment can engender an institutional "short man's" complex.5 
The Air Force also is preoccupied in developing elaborate arguments to defend its 
independence.6 Air Force offic~rs are extremely sensitive to Air Force "bashing." 
Constructive criticism or good-natured ribbing elicit a knee-jerk defense mechanism among 
Air Force officers that is as unattractive as it is unwarrantedJ Within the institution, 
4 Bryan Sterling, The Best o/Will Rogers (New York: Crown Publishers, 1979), 115; quoted in 
Builder, The Icarus Syndrome, 71. Emphasis added. 
5 Herbert Simon observed that a person: "Does not live for months or years in a particular 
position in an organization, exposed to some streams of communication, shielded from others, without the 
most profound effects upon what he knows, believes, attempts to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes, fears, and 
proposes." Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1976), xvi; 
quoted 'in Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II 
(Ithaca: Cornell Universi~ Press, 1995),20. 
6 For example, Philip Gold complained that: "Today, nobody questions the Marines because the 
British failed at the Gallipoli landing in 1915, or sneers at modern warships because a claque of long-dead 
admirals resisted the shift from sail to steam. Yet the Air Force finds itself constantly attacked because of 
what some British or Italian (or American) zealot proposed 50 or 70 years ago ... or because of some ripped-
out-of-context Air Force comments in the aftermath of Desert Storm." Philip Gold, "What the Air Force 
Can Do for You," Washington Times, 6 July 1998. 
7 The findings of this thesis were briefed by the author to over eighty Naval Postgraduate School 
stud,ents consisting of roughly fifty Navy, fifteen Army, eight Marin~s, and seven Air Force officers. The 
findings were phrased to provoke and stimulate class discussion. With the exception of the Air Force 
officers, all the services' representatives hastened to defend their cultures. On one of the debrief sheets, 
however, an Air Force officer had written: "You made four jokes on the Air Force, two on the Navy, and 
none on the others-what did the Air Force ever do to you?" If the Air Force is being "bashed' more so 
than the other services, which is not unreasonable to assume, it may be because Air Force officers are easily 
provoked. 
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airmen's inability to tolerate self-criticism results in a highly charged, reactionary 
environment.8 Internal debates are characterized less by intelligent and reasoned 
arguments and more by a pillorying of participants bold enough to question the canons of . 
airpower. In a joint context, institutional paranoia inhibits constructive discussions on the 
merits of airpower. It acts as a catalyst to raise already contentious inter-service debates 
to internecine levels,9 which hinders the adoption of a holistic approach to strategy. 
Second, Air Force officers have a narrow, theoretical approach to strategy. The 
American air force was conceived around a theory rooted in the assumption that wars can 
be won from the air. The Air Force's legitimacy as an independent service and its 
assertion that land power and airpower are equal and interdependent forces rests on such 
a theory. 10 The theory that airpower can be employed decisively by striking at the heart 
of the enemy is contained in Air Force basic service doctrine, of which there have been at 
least twelve different versions in the last fifty years. I I Described by the Air Force in 
8 The author has been struck by the number of times the term "nonattribution" appears in Air 
Force literature and is used in discussions with Air Force officers. Builder may be correct in stating that the 
Air Force has a highly analytical culture which facilitates debates on internal questions. Builder, The Icarus 
Syndrome, 24. Indeed, within the Air Force-and in particular within the ranks of its flag officers-there is 
a lot of open discussion on how to resolve Air Force problems. Unlike the other services, however, the Air 
Force does not easily forgive officers who air the service's dirty laundry in print, however constructively, 
even in official Air Force pUblications. 
9 Richard Szafranski points out that General Merrill McPeak, chief of staff of the Air Force, 
"violated some of the norms of interservice rivalry in his public testimony before the Commission on 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) in 1992. Szafranski observed that: "We might expect 
the Army and the Navy to feel free to address, however reluctantly, such things as the added value and cost 
of the F-22 aircraft .... If the Army and the Navy fmd direct attacks on the Air Force necessary or even 
highly useful, we might also expect them to attribute their behavior to the Air Force's previous behavior." 
Richard Szafranski, "Interservice Rivalry in Action: The Endless Roles and Missions Refrain," Airpower 
Journal 10, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 53-54 
10 Carl H. Builder, The Masks o/War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 28. 
11 To note that the Air Force has published twelve doctrines is not to say that there have been 
twelve different theoretical concepts. The Air Force has had three major doctrines over that period: strategic 
74 
revelatory terms as "What we hold true about aerospace power,"12 Air Force basic 
service doctrine is almost exclusively theory. It explains how airpower works and why it 
is important to those who must support it. Theory colors almost every action of the Air 
Force. The Air Force defends itself using theory. It explains its missions and strategies in 
terms of theory. Many Air Force officers believe that since their service lacks a deep 
historical record compared to the other services, the Air Force has no other choice than to 
argue from theory.I3 Such a milieu produces officers who are not adverse to theory. 
As result of its theoretical mind-set, the Air Force, by its own hand, finds itself in 
a Catch-22. It can only justify its existence based on the theory that airpower is decisive 
by itself. To have been equivocal on that point during its struggle for independence might 
have implied uncertainty about the early advocates' cause. Yet the theory that airpower is 
decisive is nearly impossible to prove because it, like naval power, is enabling in nature. 
By definition, since people live on land, the effect of airpower and seapower on the 
course and outcome of war can only be indirect. Indirect, however, does not necessarily 
mean secondary or indecisive. Indeed, airpower has been a decisive element in almost all 
of America's major wars of this century. The intuitive mind of a Navy officer is 
comfortable with the intangible nature of seapower and airpower. The narrow, theoretical 
mind of an Air Force officer, however, has difficulty accepting the intangible nature of 
nuclear bombing (1953-1971); a shift to tactical airpower (1971-1992); and no overarching universal 
formula (1992-present). Szafranski, 59 (note 20). 
12 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 
United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Department ofthe Air Force, March 1992), vii. 
13 For an example of such reasoning, see Szafranski, "Interservice Rivalry in Action." 
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airpower and its successes. In the engineering mind of Air Force officers, airpower is a 
problem that needs solving. 
With such institutional interests vested in a single theory, Air Force officers are 
not content with anything less than decisive victory delivered solely by Air Force aircraft. 
The inferable nature of its successes over Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Vietnam, and 
Iraq drives the Air Force to maniacal lengths to prove to itself and its detractors once and 
for all that airpower by itself can be decisive. Like Yossarian, the Air Force "has decided 
to live forever or die in the atlempt."14 While few can conceive of a conflict where 
airpower would not be useful, let alone indirectly decisive, the drive to prove that 
airpower acting independently of other kinds of forces can deliver victory drives a wedge 
between the air service and the other services, provides a lightening rod for its detractors' 
arguments, and feeds a gnawing sense of institutional insecurity within the Air Force. 
Third, more so than any other service, the Air Force is enamoured with 
technology. Ifflight is a gift of technology, and if technology poses the only limits on the 
freedoms of that gift, then it is to be expected that technology will be pursued by those 
who love to fly.IS The pursuit of technology might also be explained by Air Force 
institutional insecurity. The more the Air Force pursues technology, the closer it comes 
to effecting a theory of discrete destruction, and the closer it comes to establishing the 
decisive capability of airpower, which, in turn, will ensure continued institutional 
independence. 
14 Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (New York: Scriber, 1994; first pub. 1955), 36. 
IS Builder, The Masks a/War, 19. 
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Air Force use of advanced technology as a panacea is, of course, reflective of 
American culture. The Army and Marine Corps possess a balanced view oftechnology.16 
The Navy enjoys technology in the context of operations. 17 In the air, as at sea, 
technology is required not merely in order to fight but for sheer survival. If only for this 
reason, argues Martin Van Creveld, the simpler the environment, the greater the benefit 
technological superiority can confer. I8 As a result, the Air Force is free to exploit the 
American cultural preferences fortechnology because the relationship between advanced 
technology and success in the Air Force's combat medium is more direct. 
As a consequence of its dogged pursuit of technology, the Air Force has an 
insatiable appetite for newer and more technologically advanced aircraft. A trade of more 
of the less sophisticated F-16s for F-15s, for example, was not a welcome choice. It 
considers fathers and sons flying the same B-52 a national disgrace. I9 When the Air Force 
has to choose between quantity and quality, it invariably selects the latter. Air Force. 
officers will become concerned more if their potential rivals produce advanced aircraft 
than if they produce vast numbers of less capable airplanes. 
16 The contrast between the Anny's emphasis on the soldier and the Air Force's attachment to 
technology is readily seen on the grounds of their military academies. The West Point plain is bordered by 
statues of Washington, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Patton. In contrast, the central area of the Air Force 
Academy is bordered by four static displays of an F-4 and F-I05 from Vietnam and an F-16 and F-15 from 
the Gulf War. 
17 The contrast between the Navy's emphasis on operations which allows little time for 
. education, and the Air Force's emphasis on technology and concomitant technical education can be seen in 
the number of doctoral degrees held by their serving line officers. In 1997, the Navy was reported to have 
only seventy-seven serving line officers with doctoral degrees while the Air Force has nearly nine hundred. 
Scott Wilson, "Instructors at Academy Fear Changes," Baltimore Sun, 17 July 1997; quoted in James M. 
Smith, USAF Culture and Cohesion: Building an Air and Space Force for the 2 t" Century, USAF 
Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 19 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: INSS, 1998),21. 
18 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War (New York: The Free Press, 1989),228-229. 
19 Builder, The Icarus Syndrome, 157. 
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Fourth, the Air Force displays a cultural identification with piloted aircraft and an 
organizational bias against unmanned vehicles. Pilots led the struggle to create an 
American air force. They led American air forces in war. They came to dominate Air 
Force leadership. As a result, Air Force culture is characterized by a two-caste 
system-the elite pilots (and to a lesser extent the non-pilot officers such as navigators 
and bombardiers) and everybody else.:W It is an article of faith among Air Force leaders 
that piloted aircraft outperform unmanned aircraft. Nowhere was the bias against 
unmanned vehicles so evident than during the development of the ballistic missile in the 
early 1950s. In comparative terms, neither the Army nor the Navy suffered the internal 
strains and bitterness that beset the Air Force during this time.21 The unique institutional 
problem with an Air Force ballistic missile was not its threat to the fighter or transport, 
but to the bomber because it offered an alternative to the traditional means of advocating 
air power, a tradition cherished by a leadership that was overwhelmingly comprised of 
bomber pilots. 
As a result of this bias, Air Force leaders may find it hard to see the revolutionary 
implications of unmanned vehicles. They may'explicitly resist technological innovation, 
such as ballistic or cruise missiles, that threaten the role of premier Air Force aircraft. 
20 It is interesting that the non-pilot flying officers in the Navy and Marine Corps appear to be 
accorded much more respect within their services than are their counterparts in the Air Force. For example, 
Builder noted that: "An Air Force officer who had served as the radar officer on the E-3 A WACS observed 
that the pilot was the mission commander; while on the Navy's E-2 Hawkeye the radar officer was the 
mission commander. He asked me whether I thought the flying or surveillance was the principal mission of 
these aircraft." Builder, The Icarus Syndrome, 227. 
21 Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976), 230-23 I. 
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Meanwhile, they may promote innovations such as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, for 
example, which do not threaten premier Air Force platforms. Another consequence of this 
bias is that Air Force leaders may choose piloted aircraft over non-piloted weapons 
systems, even though the latter may be better able to prove the assertion that wars can be 
won from the air. In terms of the RMA, the predilection for piloted aircraft is so strong 
that the Air Force will have tremendous difficulties in transferring the share of its strike 
capabilities from bombers to precision-guided unmanned missiles that will not require the 
services of airborne launch platforms.22 This transition will be more difficult than the 
transition into space operations, which presumably would be crewed. Indeed, for an 
institution that is on the leading edge of technology and professes that wars can be won 
from the air, the Janus-faced nature of the Air Force on technology is surprising. 
Fifth, the Air Force emphasizes offensive air operations and the need to gain air 
superiority. Like sea warfare, taking an offensive posture is much easier in the air than 
taking a defensive stance. As deduced by Guilio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy 
Mitchell, the offensive use of airpower allows one to take the fight to the enemy. The 
enemy's armies, population and war-making centers can be bombed to the point where 
the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. 
Air Force strategies stress power projection, but not at the expense of establishing 
and maintaining command of the air. Like sea-control to the Navy, the Air Force sees the 
need to gain air superiority as a central issue. The Air Force cannot bring airpower to bear 
22 If the means of air power continues to be narrowly limited to primarily piloted vehicles and if 
Air Force missiliers and space technicians continue to be excluded from the executive leadership of the Air 
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effectively against the enemy unless command of the air is achieved (air superiority 
cannot be achieved, as the early advocates argued, by an air arm supporting and 
subordinated to ground commanders). The Air Force believes that air superiority is best 
achieved not through defensive measures such as anti-aircraft fire or missiles (which may 
not be able to secure command of the air over enemy territory), but through offensive air 
operations conducted by fighter aircraft. 
Because it emphasi,zes offensive air operations, those means of warfare that are 
compatible with power projection such as F-15Es, F-117s, and B-2s (and their air-to-
surface munitions) are funded more so than tanker, theater or global-airlift programs. 
Because of the overarching neeQ for command of the air, moreover, there is also much 
emphasis on developing and constructing advanced air superiority fighters such as 
F-15ClDs and F-22s (and their air-to-air missiles) and, to a lesser extent, surveillance 
aircraft such as the E-3B/C Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (A WACS). The 
disdain for air defenses means that the enemy's surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-
aircraft artillery are not as highly regarded as enemy fighters. There is therefore much less 
emphasis on types of platforms designed to combat enemy air defenses and their SAMs, 
such as the retired F -4G Wild Weasel and the recently retired EF -111 A Raven. 
Sixth, due to its experiences in the Cold War, the Air Force views itself as the 
nation's predominant strategic instrument. In 1947, the National Security Act which 
estaplished the Air Force as an independent service, required that it prepare forces for a 
Force, what is stopping the missiliers and space advocates from arguing, as did the Air Force forefathers 
before them, that these means should be independently controlled for their effective development and use? 
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mix of "independent" functions such as air superiority, strategic bombardment, and 
strategic reconnaissance, and "cooperative" functions, such as air defense, air transport, 
/support of joint amphibious and airborne operations, and assisting the Army and the 
Navy. 
In what would become the raison d'etre of the Air Force from 1947 until the late 
1980s, the National Security Act also required the Air Force to "support national 
interests."23 As'the Air Force views it, the Navy believes itself to be the guarantor of the 
greatness of the American empire. The rookie Air Force, by contrast, was called out of 
the "bullpen" to protect the nation from the horrors of nuclear holocaust and possible 
national extinction.24 American leaders' decision to use the Air Force as a strategically 
oriented service, which was not inconsistent with Air Force leaders' own conception of· 
the role of airpower, shaped its Title 10 responsibilities such as doctrine, aircraft 
weapons-system development, and force structure throughout the Cold War. For thirty 
years, the overarching mission of the Air Force was not to chase MiGs across the Yalu or 
fling napalm across rice paddies; rather, it was to operate as a strategic instrument of 
national policy first to deter and, failing that, to protect, and preserve national integrity 
23 Harry S. Truman, "Executive Order 9877: Functions of the Armed Forces," 26 July 1947. 
Reprinted in The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions, ed. Richard I. Wolf 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987),87-90; quoted in James M. Smith, "The United 
States Air Force in the Joint Battlespace: USAF Vision, Joint Vision, and National Strategy" (paper 
presented at the 1998 Institute for National Security Studies' annual meeting, Monterey, Calif.: 6-7 
November 1998), 8. 
24 Department of the Air Force, AFM 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Air Force, March 1953); quoted in Smith, "The United States Air Force in the 
Joint Battlespace," 8. 
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and values.25 The Americans turned to the Air Force as their preferred instrument in the 
conduct of the Cold War. 
Because it views itself as the nation's predominant strategic instrument, the Air 
Force focuses its spending and systems development on strategic and high-end 
operational systems such as the B-52, B-2, and F-117 and then adapts these systems for 
lower-spectrum missions when necessary. 26 Even though it is still required to continue 
nuclear deterrence and be. fully prepared to conduct major wars, the Air Force strategic 
paradigm may inhi~it it from understanding how it can operationally and fiscally support 
lower-spectrum missions better. The Air Force may become obstinate when it hears the 
Joint Staff or unified commanders-in-chief advocate policies or strategies that are not in 
accord with the Air Force's strategic perspective. 
Seventh, the Air Force emphasizes that Air Force airpower should be executed in 
a decentralized fashion, yet centrally controlled by pilots. Because air warfare is much 
more rapid and reactive than land warfare, combat effectiveness in the air is more efficient 
when led at the lowest possible level of command. The concept of strategic bombardment 
rests on a logistical concept ofwarfighting. From the early 1920s, airmen have been taught 
to discover, prioritize, and destroy those elements of "vital centers" or "centers of 
25 The Air Force desire to protect the nation at times overrode political restraints. Fred Kaplan 
recounts in The Wizards of Armageddon an incident between Robert Sprague, a civilian defense analyst, 
and the head of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Curtis LeMay. " 'IfI see that the Russians are 
amassing their planes for an attack,' LeMay continued, 'I'm going to knock the shit of them before they 
take off the ground.' Sprague was thunderstruck by the revelation .... Most startling was LeMay's final bit 
of news, that he would order a preemptive attack against Soviet air bases. 'But General LeMay,' Sprague 
said, 'that's not national policy.' 'I don't care,' LeMay replied. 'It's my policy. That's what I'm going 
to do'." Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 134. 
26 Smith, "The United States Air Force in the Joint Battlespace," 13. 
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gravity" that are essential to the enemy's ability to wage war. Central planning and 
execution will assure that maximum effort will be brought to bear on these elements, 
whose destruction will result in decisive victory. In the view of airmen, airpower must 
not be squandered or its potential wasted by parceling it across the battlefront to many 
commanders. The strategic air campaigns over Nazi Germany, North Vietnam, and Iraq, 
and the development of the SlOP all reflect the Air Force predilection for central 
planning. 
Because the Air Force emphasizes that Air Force airpower should be controlled 
by airmen and from all airman.'s perspective, the Air Force dominates the air-campaign 
planning process.27 The air component commander has to integrate the tactical 
perspective of the ground services with the Air Force strategic perspective. Airmen view 
targets not in terms of enemy artillery batteries or tank columns, but as functional, 
sequenced effects upon enemy systems that encompass the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels ofwar.28 As in the Gulf War, the Air Force component commander may 
plan two simultaneous air campaigns--one strategic and the other tactical-to 
accommodate these divergent views. 
27 As Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor noted: "The air war [in the Gulf War] was ... riddled 
with interservice tensions. To run the air campaign, a Joint Forces Air Component Commander was 
created. The Air Force dominated the process. Its planners believed in centralized control of airpower and 
attacks against targets critical to the overall campaign, but the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy were 
unhappy with the system. The Air Force believed it was weakening the enemy by hitting Iraqi forces at 
home and with the "kill boxes" it drew on battlefield maps, but the Army and Marines complained that 
specific targets were ignored that they wanted to be hit." Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The 
Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf(Boston: Little, Brown, 1995),472. 
28 Smith, "The United States Air Force in the Joint Battlespace," 17. 
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Eighth, the Air Force has a more expansive perspective ofthe battlefield than 
either the Army or the Marine Corps. Air Force pilots tend to think in strategic terms 
because they believe the Air Force is the nation's predominant strategic instrument. They 
tend to think in strategic terms because of their institution's drive to prove the 
decisiveness of strategic bombardment. But the main reason they think in strategic terms 
is that they view the battlefield from above, with the benefit of wide vision and extensive 
reach. Their theater-wide perspective is of a scope, scale, and focus that is much different 
from soldiers and Marines. The ran~e of the ground services' perceptions is limited to the 
battlefield in front of their forces, which is much smaller in scale than the theater-wide 
scale of the Air Force operational mind-set. In advancing to their objectives, soldiers and 
Marines tend to focus on threats that loom on the battlefield as they must first safeguard 
their forces. The ground units must attacks things in comparative sequence because they 
cannot reach targets to the depths available to the Air Force. In the Air Force view, there 
is much more to war than destroying the nearest tank column; air superiority must be 
achieved and maintained, enemy supply routes must be interdicted; and enemy command-
and-control capabilities must be rendered useless. The operational mind-set of a pilot is 
focused on what targets, if destroyed, will most contribute to winning the war, then the 
campaign, and then the battle. In the Air Force view, airpower can win battles or it can 
win wars. 
As a result of its comparatively more expansive operational mind-set, the Air 
Force is reluctant to develop detailed, joint operational doctrine not only because 
prescriptive doctrine, if adhered to, restricts the ability of Air Force aviators to fight in 
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such a dynamic environment, but also because of the divergent perspectives of the Air 
Force and the ground services. Because it reflects Army doctrine more than the other 
services' doctrines, joint operational doctrine reflects the perspective of the commander 
of the Army's principle maneuver unit, the division. The range of the division 
commander's perceptions of the battlefield is based on a division's operational area: 
roughly 300 by 100 miles, depending on the terrain and disposition of the enemy. The 
division commander, faci1!g a direct and present threat, focuses on the immediate 
battlefield.29 The Air Force sees attempts to "shoehorn" its efforts and perspective into a 
small box for the sake of a ground commander's objectives as a serious misuse of 
airpower. 30 In the Air Force's .view, joint doctrine that emphasizes the requirements of 
the division commander seriously limits the efficiency and effectiveness of American 
airpower. 
. The Air Force has had difficulty writing operational doctrine, in contrast to the 
Army and Marine Corps, and to a lesser extent the Navy. Only recently has the Air 
Force begun to articulate the mind-set of the airman and demonstrate how airpower can 
best be used. Unless the Air Force continues to describe its style of fighting in ajoint 
doctrinal context, joint operational doctrine will remain highly reflective of the limited 
ground-service perspective. 
The Air Force cultural mind-set is difficult to understand. The Air Force is a 
different kind of military institution. Air Force institutiopal insecurity and the nature of 
29 Ibid., 19-20. 
30 Ibid., 19. 
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air warfare make it difficult on the Air Force to integrate itself into a more joint military. 
The Air Force has to work hard at explaining a cogent vision of airpower to airmen and to 
the other services without appearing to proselytize. It is ironic that the Air Force is so 
troubled because the United States is primarily an air power rather than a land power, sea 
power, space power, or nuclear power. America is an air-using society with a large and 
longstanding scientific-industrial base to develop commercial and military air power.31 
Indeed, airpower is the quintessential American weapon. It distinctively demonstrates 
American high technology; it raises war literally above the messiness of the conflict on the 
ground where alien cultures reside; it promises few American casualties; and it uses a 
theory of discrete destruction that promises a direct and quick route to absolute victory 
without overly taxing society's patience. 
31 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1996),85. 
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VII. U.S. MARINE CORPS 
Marine Corps culture is more tightly-knit and homogeneous than the other 
services' cultures. Its history as an institution is marked by bloody battles on the 
periphery of U.S. interests and by constant political struggles to secure its existence. Its 
history, small size,! and emphasis on warfighting engenders a semper fidelis, "band of 
brothers" mentality that makes the Marine Corps the most cohesive of military 
institutions. As Thomas Ricks discerned, the culture that the Marines most resemble is 
that of Japan.2 The Marines mirror the Japanese in many respects-frugality,3 
harmonious intra-cultural relations, a hierarchical social structure, and an emphasis on the 
group rather than on the individual. Like Japanese culture, Marine culture is a culture of 
the group, made up of members who are anonymous. These cultures inculcate an 
acceptance of the needs of the group while repressing' individual desires. Both cultures are 
physically and even psychologically isolated from the larger world. At times, both seem 
to revel in their separateness. Both cultures inculcate an awareness that everyone 
! Just how small the Marine Corps is was brought home to the author one morning in the 
Pentagon. Upon not recognizing a Marine major who had just walked past, a Marine major friend turned 
and said, "Hmm, I don't know him." 
2 Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Scribner, 1997), 199-201. 
3 The Marine Corps prides itself on making do and using hand-me-down tanks and other items. It 
prides itself on surviving and thriving on only 6 percent of the Department of Defense budget As Thomas 
Ricks noted: "The Marine culture of frugality is brought home to anyone traveling on a Marine aircraft who 
is offered a Diet Coke-and then asked for fifty cents payment. Outside speakers at a meeting at the 
Marines' Amphibious School are invited to lunch-and then served a chunk of a Subway sandwich made 
up of baloney, American cheese, and pickles. Marine infrastructures-barracks, officer housing, day care 
centers-tends [sic] to be the worst in the U.S. military, giving many Marine facilities as anachronistic 
feel, with old sinks and cracked tiles in the bathrooms, like an unrenovated pre-World War II high school. 
[Then Marine Corps Commandant] Al Gray, when asked about improving the "quality of life" of his 
Marines and their families, famously replied that the best quality of life he knew was actually having a life, 
so he would put his money into troop training." Ibid., 199. 
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contributes, from the top to the bottom. Indeed, much more than the other services, 
Marines·place pride and responsibility at the lowest levels of the organization. 
Marines see the need to have only one officer for 8.8 enlistees. That is a.wider ratio than 
any of the other services. The Air Force, at the other end of the spectrum, has one officer 
for four enlistees. Some 49 percent of Marines are in the service's three lowest ranks (E-
1, E-2, and E-3). This is almost twice the percentage in the other three services.4 Because 
the essence of Marine Corps organization resides on the infantryman, Marine culture sets 
a high premium on leadership skills in the lower enlisted ranks. Marine units, regardless of 
the number of casualties to its officers and senior enlisted personnel, will never be 
without leaders who have full awareness of their responsibilities and who understand that 
they will be held accountable for the actions of their units. Every Marine believes that the 
U.S. Marine Corps is more than a crack military organization; to them it is a blood 
fraternity that obligates every Marine to uphold the honor and tradition of America's 
only elite service. 
There are at least five aspects of Marine Corps culture that influence the 
development of U.S. strategy. First, partly because of their sense of vulnerability, Marine 
culture-like Japanese culture-cultivates a sense of candid self-review that makes it 
more willing to entertain internal and external criticism. Both cultures are concerned not so 
much with laying blame as with identifying problems. Rather than sweep faults and 
weakness under the rug, Marines tend to view them as possible threats to the institution. 
4 Ibid., 19. 
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This candor is present in all ranks within the Marine Corps. It surprises Army and Air 
Force officers how honest Marines in the field can be, and even more surprising that 
Marine officers are willing to let their troops be so candid. 5. This candor is not restricted 
to debates within the private confines of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps Gazette 
consistently publishes the most forceful, name-naming self-criticism of any U.S. military 
publication. In marked contrast to the Air Force, the Marine Corps encourages its officers 
to write harsh articles that criticize aspects of their own service. The Gazette's 
willingness to be critical even extend.s to letting junior officers criticize serving 
commanders by name in print. 
A system of candid self-review results in a continuous learning process in the 
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is the most innovative service in terms of examining 
and testing new operational concepts. Marines are constantly engaged in innovative 
experiments such as the Hunter Warrior concept that integrates advanced information 
technology with dispersed rifle squads using other ground and aerial observers and 
sensors.6 The Marine Corps established its Warfighting Laboratory to test the efficacy of' 
. new concepts and technologies. In the post-Cold War environment, the Navy finds itself 
continually reacting to the Marines' energetic strategic thinking and operational 
innovations. 
5 Ibid., 192. 
6 For an assessment of the Hunter Warrior concept by a Marine officer, see John F. Schmitt, "A 
Critique of the HUNTER WARRIOR Concept, Marine Corps Gazette 82, no. 6 (June 1998): 13-19. 
89 
Second, the Marine Corps has a balanced view of the role technology plays in 
strategy. The Marine Corps operates at sea and in air with just one purpose in mind, to 
support its principal weapons system, the rifleman on the ground.7 Consequently, the 
Marine Corps places more emphasis on increasing its Marines' combat skills than on 
Marines' equipment. Like the Army, the Marine Corps believes the human dimension of 
war to be more important than the technological dimension.8 
The centrality of the human dimension in war means that the Marine Corps is 
sensitive to the human aspects of war and strategy. Its principle doctrine, FMFM 1: 
Warfighting, emphasizes friction, the chaotic environment of war, the enemy's will to 
wage war, the need for surprise, and boldness in combat.9 Marine Corps officers have a 
more holistic view of war than Navy and Air Force officers, and tend to be much more 
aware of factors that may influence war and strategy, other than those related to 
technology or weapons systems. While the Marine Corps has some prescriptive 
operational doctrine, FMFM 1 is more a philosophy on Marine warfighting than a 
discussion on operational doctrine. Indeed, FMFM I is more a treatise on the nature of 
war. In a sense, FMFM I sumS up the writings of Thucydides and Clausewitz on war in 
terms that a high school graduate can understand. Upon reading it, one also gets the sense 
7 Ibid., 202. 
8 See Paul K. Van Ripper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Preparing for War in the 21 st Century," 
Parameters 27 (Autumn 1997): 4-14. 
9 U.S. Department of the Navy, FMFM 1: Warfighting (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Navy, 1989). 
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that, of all the services, only the Marine Corps has learned why the United States was 
defeated in Vietnam. 10 
Third, Marines see themselves as modern samurais in the way they look at 
themselves and in the way they relate to the nation. The Marine Corps has always been 
remote from the rest of society. Marines devote vast resources to assimilating their 
members. If it wants to maintain roots in society, the Army has to endure the presence of 
populist societal values su.ch as fairness, equality, independence, and the rights of an 
individual in its organization. In contrast, the Marine Corps sees little need to maintain 
roots in society. Consequently, it feels little compunction in stamping out traits that may 
detract from its organizational ~ffectiveness. To make the Marine Corps a more effective 
fighting organization, it inculcates such characteristics as integrity, instant obedience, 
trust, taking responsibility for one's actions, and loyalty to the Corps and to one's fellow 
Marine. 
Over the last thirty years, however, as American culture has become more 
fragmented, individualistic, and consumerist, the Marines have ~ecome more withdrawn 
10 In the late 1980s, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray introduced a formal 
reading list, not just for officers but for all ranks. As Ricks noted: "Staff sergeants and first lieutenants, the 
men who run platoons, were told to read, among other books, [James] Webb's Fields of Fire. First 
sergeants tackled Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Captains, who run rifle companies, were assigned Tom 
Peter's Thriving on Chaos. Majors, who typically are mired in staff jobs, had to look at life differently by 
reading Mao Tse-tung's On Guerrilla Warfare, for which the author was listed, in typical Marine style, as 
"Mao, T.," as ifhe were one more shavehead recruit. Lieutenant colonels were asked to look at the very 
big picture: Solzhenitsyn's August 1914, Thucydides's Pelonnesian War, and Tolstoy'S War and Peace. 
Most pointedly, colonels were yanked back to reality by having their noses rubbed in a library of military 
failure: Neil Sheehan's Bright and Shining Lie, about the U.S. war effort in Vietnam; General Giap's How 
We Won the War, a view from the victor's side of that conflict; Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers, about how military spending can undercut national security; and C.S. Forester's un deservedly 
obscure The General, a gloomy meditation on how good but unimaginative officers could lead a generation 
of British youth to slaughter in World War I." Ricks, 145-146. 
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from society .11 Like Japanese samurais, the Marines display a sense of disdain for the 
very society they protect. When looking at America, Marines see a decadent society 
weakened by laziness and selfishness. Over the last thirty years, the Marines have moved, 
from thinking of themselves as a more wholesome version of American society to a kind 
of dissenting critique ofit. I2 In an open letter to the Washington Times, for example, 
Marine reserve Major Daniel Rabil stated: 
Our military's heart and soul can survive lean budgets, but they cannot 
survive in an America that would tolerate such a character as now occupies 
the Oval Office .... To subject our services to such debased leadership is 
nothing less than the collective spit of the entire nation upon our faces. Bill 
Clinton has always been a moral coward. He has always had contempt for 
the American military .... Bill Clinton is no longer funny. He is 
dangerous. I3 
While the Marine Corps may be one of the few parts of the federal government that 
retains the deep trust of the American people, such vocalized views may engender a 
distrust of the Corps among society. With their incessant emphasis on honor, courage, 
and commitment, the Marines may further separate themselves from the society they are 
to protect and, in doing so, may raise the ire of society. 
The Marines' movement toward a new kind of open and active political 
conservatism should not be viewed as an indicator of where the rest of the military is 
today, but instead of where it might be heading. With the end of the Cold War, the other 
II Ibid., 22. 
12 For an assessment of Marine Corps' views on American culture and the culture of the Marines, 
see: George J. Flynn, "Understanding the Gap;" Timothy J. Hiel, "A Historical Perspective on Military 
Isolation;" John E. Coonradt, "Core Values;" and James B. Woulfe, "Our Leadership Challenge" in 
Marine Corps Gazette 82, no. 9 (September 1998). 
I3 Daniel J. Rabil, "Please, Impeach my Commander in Chief," Washington Times, 9 November 
1998. 
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services are becoming more like the Marines-smaller, insular, and expeditionary. 
Consequently, the U.S. military might come to playa more active role in political 
decisions and, in doing so, might reawaken American societal suspicions against its 
professional military. 
Fourth, Marines are the least inclined to operate with the other U.S. military 
services. The deep culture that distinguishes and sustains the Corps also engenders a 
narrow perspective captured in the Marine aphorism that: "There is a right way, a wrong 
way, and the Marine way." The Marine culture and the Marine way of doing things runs 
so deep that Marines do not readily accommodate elements of other services that are 
different from their own. During the Korean and Vietnam wars and the Grenada 
operation, for example, the Marine Corps was reluctant to let the Army use its 
helicopters. During the Somalia operations in the early 1990s, Army women, accustomed 
to sleeping in the same barracks as their male counterparts, were upset when the Marine 
commander overseeing the operation ordered the women to move to segregated sleeping 
areas. In the same operation, Marine commanders again unthinkingly imposed Marine 
rules by denying Air Force personnel per diem payments which the airmen had been 
receiving since the start of the operation.14 
The hesitance of Marines to operate with the other services seems 
counterintuitive. The Marine Corps, after all, is the only service that operates on land, at 
sea, and in the air. Consequently, it has a better understanding of the environments in 
14 Ricks, 202-203. 
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which the other services operate. The Marine Corps, however, operates on the sea and in 
the air with just one purpose in mind, to support the all-important rifleman on the 
ground. IS This is not the same perspective as in the Air Force or the Navy. Even the 
Anny, with its combined-anns approach, does not share the Marines' single-mindedness 
towards the infantryman. As a result, Marines are reluctant to have representatives from 
other services command their troops or develop and execute their campaign strategies. 16 
They prefer to operate by themselves or in concert with the Navy. Like the Navy, the 
Marine Corps is reluctant to go outside its ranks and let American defense intellectuals 
develop and articulate its assumptions and strategic concepts. 
The Marine Corps may vocalize its views in strong tenns when it sees the 
military establishment advocate top-down concepts or visions that are supposed to serve 
as a template to channel the collective efforts of the anned forces. For example, the 
Marine Corps has been vocal in its opposition to Joint Vision 2010. Marines believe that 
it is overly dependent on technology, misdirected towards high-intensity conflict, and 
offers a potentially grave strategy-capability mismatch in fighting America's small and 
limited conflicts such as those conducted in Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia. 17 
15 Ibid., 202. 
16 Partly because of their experiences in Vietnam, Marines are particularly suspicious of Anny 
operational strategies and tactics. In that conflict, the Marines were discouraged from applying their 
knowledge of counterinsurgency operations. Despite their vast experience in fighting small wars which are 
characterized by limited goal and means, the Marines in Vietnam were pushed by General William 
Westmoreland into waging an attritional, defensive style ofw~rfare. 
17 See Paul K. Van Riper, "More on Innovation and Jointness," Marine Corps Gazette 82, no. 3 
(March 1998): 55-57. 
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Fifth, the central element in Marine culture is its abiding sense of vulnerability as 
an institution. Every Marine is taught from the first few weeks of recruit training that the 
existence of the Marine Corps is always in danger. The Marine Corps' first experience 
with inter-service conflict began a fortnight after the Continental Congress resolved on 10 
November 1775 that two battalions of "American marines" be raised. Not wanting to lose 
any troops to the proposed marine battalions, General George Washington was able to 
convince Congress to draw the battalions from elsewhere, and as a result the two 
battalions were never formed. 
From the American R~volution war until the early part of the twentieth century, 
there was a running battle between the Navy and the Marine Corps over the following 
roles of Marines onboard ship (the Navy wanted Marines to work as sailors as well as 
provide internal security); precedence between officers (the Navy thought that the most 
junior Navy officer should take precedence over all Marine officers); and who should have 
authority over Marines on duty at naval stations ashore. As Victor Krulak noted, this 
running battle contributed greatly to the institutional paranoia so identified with the 
COrpS.I8 Due to adroit political maneuvering, the Marine Corps thwarted President 
Andrew Jackson's proposal of 1830 to merge with the Army. During the Civil War, two 
committees in the House of Representative, at the behest of the War Department, again 
considered then rejected proposals to transfer the Corps to the Army. In 1866, 1867, and 
18 Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the u.s. Marine Corps (Annapolis, Md.: 
U.S. Naval Institute, 1884), 7. 
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1868, proposals sponsored by the administration or the Army to transfer or abolish the 
Corps were accompanied by stormy debates in Congress. 
Between the late 1880s and 1908, the Navy tried to remove the Marines from its 
ships (although the Navy objected strongly to losing the Corps entirely), and the Army 
tried with the support of President Theodore Roosevelt to assimilate the Corps. As a 
result of the Marines' role in World War I and the Army perception that the Marines' 
contribution had been exaggerated in public accounts, the interwar Army unsuccessfully 
tried to restrict the Marine Corps to,roles onboard ships and to limited operations in 
support of naval campaigns. 
The greatest period of institutional anxiety, however, came during unification of 
the American armed forces after the Second W orId War. Caught in the complex currents of 
the political environment, the Marine Corps found itself up against a strong coalition 
between the Executive branch, Congress, and the War Department. The coalition wanted 
to relegate the Corps' amphibious assault mission to the Army, give its aircraft to the 
newly established Air Force, thereby dismantling the potent air-ground-integrated Fleet 
Marine Force (FMF) concept, and constrain the Corps' missions to those performed by 
the Marine Corps of the nineteenth century .19 Marine planners believed that only 
legislative protection would save the FMF and, by implication, its own existence. 
Due to the successful amphibious landings off Inchon, Korea by American forces 
in 1950, the laudable performance of Marines in that conflict, and astute Congressional 
19A1lan R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The History of the u.s. Marine Corps (New York: 
Macmillan, 1980), 456--457. 
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lobbying by Marines and friends of the Corps, the Marine Corps was able to secure its 
existence. By 1952, the Marine Corps had gained statutory status with a legislated size, 
legislated roles and missions (which retained the FMF capability), and a legislative partial, 
status for the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, 
the Marine Corps was designated as the nation's force in readiness to suppress or contain 
international disturbances short ofwar.20 
As a result of its sense of vulnerability, the Marine Corps came to appreciate the 
great importance of maintaining the confidence and respect of Congress and the public. It 
casts a wary eye towards the institutions (i.e., the White House, the Army, and the 
Navy) that have instigated moves to try to abolish or downsize the Corps. There have 
been at least fifteen occasions since 1775 when its preservation has been due wholly to a 
concerned Congress.21 The need to seek justification in the eyes of the public prompted 
the Marine Corps to cultivate deep ties with the press corps. Ricks noted that: "Even 
second lieutenants at the Basic School are imbued with the importance of public relations: 
A reporter walking around the campus at Quanti~o is greeted consistently with lines such 
as, 'Glad to have you here to tell the Marine story' ."22 Every Marine understands the 
need to promote the Corps and the need to be a walking representative of the Corps. The 
close ties with Congress and the unabashed desire for publicity have long irritated the 
20 Adam B. Seigel, Who Will Do What With What: Defining Us. Navy and Marine Corps 
Roles, Functions, and Missions (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, 1993), 14. 
21 Krulak, 13. 
22 Ricks, 198. 
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other services, who believe efforts to further integrate the services may be circumvented 
by the Corps and its friends in Congress. 
There is, however, another more important aspect to the Marines' paranoia. While 
it needs an army, navy, and even an air force, the United States does not need a Marine 
Corps-the United States wants a Marine Corps. If the country changes its mind, if it 
thinks the Marine Corps has lost its usefulness to society, the Marine Corps-like any 
organization in society that has lost its edge-will cease to exist. As a result, Marines are 
driven by the need to deliver success in combat. The Marine Corps has made itself into a 
highly responsive, flexible, and adaptable institution. The Marine Corps is continually 
exploring the future security environment to determine which missions and roles will be . 
important to the United States in the future. It then adapts itself to missions the other 
services do not want or cannot see, such as amphibious warfare or fighting America's 
small wars. The history of the Marine Corps is essentially a history of institutional 
survival and adaptation. 
Marine culture is the richest culture in the U.S. military: formalistic, isolated, 
elitist, with a deep anchor in their own history and mythology.23 Indeed, the Marine 
Corps feeds on its history. No other service celebrates its birthday as the biggest event on 
the calendar. The Air Force has its advanced aircraft; the Navy has its ships; and the 
Army has its citizen-soldier. However, culture is all the Marines have.24 It is what has 
held them together along the beaches of Guadalcanal, around the temples of Hue, amongst 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 19. 
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the remains of a Marine barracks in Beirut, and in Congressional committee rooms. It is 
what holds Marines together now and will hold the Corps together in the future. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
A. CULTURAL SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
This analysis suggests that American culture and the cultures of the U.S. military 
services influence the American process of formulating strategy. If these cultural 
characteristics are strong, persistent, and ubiquitous, then they should be guides to future 
events. The United States is likely to perform more effectively in large-scale wars and in 
wars where absolute victories can be obtained. Planning and execution of a D-Day-style 
landing, of nuclear deterrence, of an intricate SlOP plan, or of a large-scale conventional 
war with redundant paths to victory would exploit America's strengths. In short, U.S. 
military power is a powerful but blunt instrument. l 
The United States may have difficulties in operations, such as those conducted in 
Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, that require subtlety in statecraft and strategy. Success in 
these kinds of operations requires a level of knowledge of culture, languages, and history 
that was conspicuously absent in Americas' efforts in Vietnam.2 Adopting a direct 
approach to operations other than war such as conflicts in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia may 
well prove ineffectual. In developing strategies for these kinds of situations, it might be 
better to view some of the "problems" that characterize such conflicts as merely 
conditions that must be taken into account. More importantly, these kinds of conflicts in 
1 Colin S. Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991," in The Making 
of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. WiIIiamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),613. 
2 During their revolutionary struggle against France and the United States, the North Vietnamese 
displayed in-depth knowledge of culture and history. See Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung, How We 
Won the War (Philadelphia: Recon, 1976). 
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particular require Americans to acknowledge that the most sophisticated of information 
technology and precision-guided weapons may not be enough to overcome the will and 
strategic skills of the enemy. 3 
The Army may hesitate to adopt RMA-like concepts and technologies. As Korea 
and Vietnam demonstrated, if the Army has prepared for the wrong kind of war, its 
failures, much more than the other services, are likely to be prominent. The Army realizes 
that it can ill-afford to close ranks around a sacred concept. Yet, there may be another 
reason why the Army may be reluctant to pursue RMA-like technologies. The two 
fundamental ideas that undergird the culture and operational mind-set of the Army are 
"seize and hold ground" and "close with and destroy the enemy." Information warfare 
and precision-guided munitions may obviate the need to "close with the enemy." The 
promise of delivering munitions with pinpoint accuracy may seem so auspicious as to' 
engender a belief that the nation does not need soldiers, needing only a couple of military 
police-style regiments to mop up the flotsam and jetsam of a futuristic battlefield. 
Besides facing situations where doctrine needs to be flexible or where direct approaches to 
absolute victories may not work, the Army may find its greatest challenge to be 
convincing others that war is a contest of human wills and not machines and that soldiers 
will continue to be needed as much in the future as in the past. 
3 As Williamson Murray noted: "What matters most in war is what is in the mind of one's 
adversary, from command post to battlefield point-of-contact. This is a truth well iIIustrated by a scene 
from the Gulf War: As a number of U.S. Marine generals stood over a relatively undamaged and well-
stocked Iraqi bunker complex that coalition forces had captured with minimum casualties and a large haul 
of prisoners, one quietly commented: 'Thank God the North Vietnamese weren't here'." Williamson 
Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris," The National 
Interest, no. 48 (Summer 1997): 63-64. 
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The Navy may have difficulties in developing and implementing its concept of 
network warfare. Like the introduction of wireless communication, Navy cultural 
inhibitions against centralization of command may prolong the implementation of a 
network-centric style of communications as Navy commanders weigh its potential 
operational advantages against the disadvantages oflimiting individual authority. The 
Navy may hesitate to develop detailed joint operational doctrine that does not 
accommodate how sailors ~hink operationally. 
The Air Force may encounter problems transitioning to a power-projection 
capability largely comprised of unmanned rockets and missiles. It may find it difficult to 
develop and sell a cogent and upifying vision of itself to maintain institutional cohesion 
without alienating the other services. Its preoccupation with effecting futuristic 
technology-based capabilities may preclude the Air Force from realizing when such 
capabilities become divorced from the realities of u.s. strategic problems. 
The Marine Corps may encounter problems in civil-military relations. The 
Marines have moved from thinking of themselves as a more wholesome version of 
American society to a kind of dissenting critique of it. With their incessant emphasis on 
honor, courage, and commitment, the Marines' movement toward a new kind of open and 
active political conservatism might reawaken American societal suspicions against the 
Marine Corps and the rest of the professional military. 
American strategists need an understanding of how the services' cultures may 
influence future strategies. American strategists need to recognize occasions when Army 
predilections towards adopting a direct approach in conflicts characterized as operations-
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other-than-war may prove ineffective. American strategists need to understand when the 
Navy would be better served by funding more mine-countermeasure ships or fast sea-lift 
ships instead of more offensive, sea-control platforms. They need to be aware when Air , 
Force tendencies towards piloted attack aircraft may needlessly endanger the lives of U.S. 
aviators. American strategists need to recognize occasions when the Army may be better 
suited for operations with coalition forces, even if the Marine Corps volunteers for such 
missions. Strategists who do not understand the sources of ideas that undergird their 
military organizations' deeply-rooted preferences may not recognize occasions when the 
political leaders' goals and the services' strategies may be poorly matched. Such 
strategists will have a difficult time recognizing when the services' cultures makes some 
endeavors unimaginable, possible, or desirable. 
American strategists should not be content with studying just the cultures of 
America's potential enemies. Those responsible for developing and executing u.S. 
strategies need to see America and the U.S. military services through the eyes of the next 
potential General Giap. As Lao-Tzu wrote: "He "Yho knows others is clever; He who 
knows himself has discenunent."4 A strategist who fails to question assumptions cannot 
be expected to expose strategic vulnerabilities, such as Americas' reliance on technology 
and machines as solutions for the problems of war. A strategist lacking cultural self-
knowledge cannot be expected to take advantage of characteristics that improve the 
nation's ability to wage war or develop strategy. 
4 Lao-Tzu, Tao-te-ching, trans. T. C. Lau, bk. 1, chap. 33 (n.p., 1963), in The Columbia 
Dictionary of Quotations [CD-ROM] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
104 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The importance of culture is an empirical question. Consequently, further research 
could contribute greatly to understanding the relationship between American strategy and 
American culture, and between American strategy and the U.S. military service cultures. 
Further research on how the services' respective environments shape their respective 
mind-sets could contribute to a better understanding of the American military institutions. 
There are at least three avenues for follow-up research. 
One might embark on an inquiry into qualifying the differences between the 
service cultures using the characteristics identified in this study as a guide. Such research 
could develop and test some of the hypotheses made about the divergent perspectives of 
the services. For example, how much does a service's operational environment shape the 
mind-sets of its officers? A study that compares the perspectives of Air Force fighter 
pilots with those of the Navy and Marine Corps fighter pilots or that compares Army 
tankers with Marine tankers might determine how much environment shapes the 
perspectives of military officers. Studies demonstrating that the services' views on 
command structures and joint operationa1 doctrine are attributable to their respective 
operating environments raise larger questions of how one might further integrate the 
efforts of the services. For example, would detailing a few mid-level Army officers to 
Navy operational staffs (with follow-up orders to Army or Navy doctrine commands) 
lead to the development of more effective joint command structures and joint operational 
doctrine? Would assigning a few Army aviation officers to Air Force squadrons improve 
AirLand Battle Doctrine? Might detailing some Navy officers to Army and Marine Corps 
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regimental staffs result in an overall appreciation of how naval forces can better enable 
victory on land? 
Military officers gain an appreciation of how officers from the other services think 
largely through interaction on joint-staff tours and in joint professional military education 
programs. Unfortunately, interaction in such sterile environments may not convey enough 
inter-service knowledge and appreciation to improve the ability of the military to fight in 
a joint manner. Understan9ing how the other services think from an operational 
perspective may engender a more holistic approach to war and strategy. Moreover, 
understanding how the other services think from an operational perspective may lead to 
an appreciation of when to fight jointly and be more accommodating when geographic, 
political, or military factors dictate the need not to fight jointly. The potential advantages 
to be gained by examining service culfures from an operational perspective appear to be· at 
least initially too attractive to ignore. 
Follow-up research also might be designed to determine if differences in the 
services' culfures may be used in a constructive manner. Such research could test some of 
the hypotheses made about the skills engendered by the services' cultures. For example, 
are Army and Marine Corps officers better strategists than Air Force and Navy officers? 
Are Navy officers better at understanding the relationship between technology and 
operations? Are Air Force officers better at envisioning how technology may affect fufure 
b(;lttJefields? Sfudies demonstrating that different U.S. military service culfures engender 
different skills raise larger questions of how the military might use such skills in a 
constructive manner. Should Army and Marine Corps officers be assigned to particular 
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strategic billets? Might Navy officers be detailed to joint technical program offices, or Air 
Force officers be assigned to joint future-concept branches? 
The inclusion of cases of non-U.S. military organizations might lead to the ability 
to identify different typologies in functional areas. In other words, is it likely that all 
armies will tend to be much more aware of the relationship between policy, strategy, and 
technology? Will all armies have a passive view of advanced technology? Will armies tend 
to be more obedient than navies or air forces? Do all air forces inherently display a drive 
for advanced technology? Are navie~ more independent-minded than armies or air forces? 
If it could be established that certain fundamental attitudes are exhibited by certain 
services regardless of nationality, the" United States might be able to exploit such 
characteristics in areas such as arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. For example, 
could policies be designed that would keep a rival nation's air force preoccupied with 
developing advanced piloted aircraft instead of using its resources to construct an 
unmanned ballistic missile? By offering training and conventional arms that are compatible 
with their war-fighting culture, can generals or admirals be convinced not to support or 
provide security for their government's nuclear proliferation projects? The notion that the 
operating environment engenders a particular mind-set which can be exploited appears to 
warrant further research. 
Further research could investigate the manner and circumstances in which service 
cultures change, as well as shed light on how to change a military's culture. These issues 
are important to policymakers interested in changing a service's strategies and weapons 
systems to ensure a match with their political goals. These issues are particularly 
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important to policymakers of democratic states in which military values and attitudes 
should echo and not challenge the principles on which the country is based.5 For example, 
does the U.S. services' relative success in dealing with racism provide lessons for those 
interested in changing aspects ofa service's culture? Why does it seem some services have 
been more successful than others in racial integration? What do these successes or failures 
say about the services' ability to address the aspects of its culture that foster sexual 
harassment? Issues of why service cultures change and how to change them are also 
important to military leaders interested in making innovative changes that may be 
antithetical to the services' cultures, or to leaders interested in efforts to keep the military 
from alienating itself further from the rest of society. 
Possibly the most effective manner through which to change aspects of a service's 
culture is through education. If service members and those who must deal with the 
services understand why the services behave the way they do, then that behavior is likely 
to become modified.6 If they are told that the folding of one's arms is "body language" 
that reflects a closed attitude, people will make a conscious effort not to fold their arms in 
conversation. The awareness arid the understanding of behavior may induce changeJ If 
they are told that war at sea engenders a belief in decentralized command structures and 
descriptive operational doctrine, people will be much more accepting of the divergent 
5 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 160. 
6 Carl H. Builder, The Masks a/War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 205. 
7 Ibid. 
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views of Navy officers. If they are told that Air Force officers have a knee-jerk defense 
mechanism, people will be more sensitive when offering advice or giving constructive 
criticism. 
It is unclear just how helpful studies on American culture and the cultures of the 
U.S. military services may prove to be. The determined researcher can usually find 
impressive empirical evidence in identifying which aspects of these cultures influence the 
U.S. strategy-making process, how these characteristics form, or how they might 
influence American strategy. It does not seem unduly optimistic, however, to assert the 
following benefits gained from examining American culture, U.S. military service cultures, 
and how such cultures influence American strategy:8 
• An appreciation of the importance of strategy in all its dimensions; 
• An appreciation of the need for cultural knowledge and cultural self-
knowledge; 
• An improved understanding of how such cultures might be shaped; and 
An improved understanding of how such culture can influence strategy, 
defense preparation, and the conduct ~fwar. 
Despite the limitations and problems of using it as an analytical tool, culture is an 
indispensable guide to the strategist. The paradigm of national or organizational culture 
can be useful in identifying hidden assumptions behind a defense community's strategy, 
in understanding the sources of ideas that underlie those assumptions, and in tracing the 
8 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton IAbt, 1986),38. 
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effects of those assumptions on the behavior of its members.9 The study of culture is an 
inseparable part of war and strategy. It arises as a natural consequence ofthe uncertainty 
inherent in planning for and conducting war. 
C. THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN STRATEGY 
The resurgence of the American military's technical hubris in the form of an 
information-led "revolution" in military affairs is indicative of the continued lack of self-
knowledge among American strategists and a lack of a more holistic perspective on war 
and strategy.lo The United States did not need more information at Pearl Harbor, and it is 
doubtful that it will need more information in the future. What the nation needs is a 
deeper understanding of the political context of war and of the differing sets of 
assumptions that U.S. opponents and the United States may bring to it. The United 
States will require knowledge of foreign languages, religious beliefs, cultures, and hist~ries 
simply because such knowledge cannot be quantified and measured. I I Many American 
strategists argue that America's failure in Vietnam stemmed from the absence of sound 
strategy. But as this thesis has demonstrated, there are deeply-rooted, historically based 
astrategic American cultural tendencies (e.g., ignorance of and indifference to other 
9 Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy 10, no. 1 (1991): 
14-15. 
10 As Williamson Murray noted: "One of the most bizarre spectacles of our century has been the 
predilection for comfortable, middle-class intellectuals to believe that revolution is a 'good' thing." 
Williamson Murray, "War, Theory, Clausewitz, and Thucydides: The Game May Change But the Rules 
Remain," Marine Corps Gazette 81, no.! (January 1997): 67. 
II Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological 
Hubris," The National Interest, no. 48 (Summer 1997): 63. 
110 
cultures as well as American culture, the waging of attritional campaigns with excessive 
reliance on machine and firepower, and indifference to the exigencies of strategy) that the 
American strategist needs to understand to forestall a repeat performance. of the Vietnam 
experience or an experience that may threaten the security of the United States. Indeed, 
the post-Cold War era may not be the first period in history when the achievements of a 
generation of vigilance may be squandere4. 
In 1025, 'the Byzantine Empire found itself more secure than it had been for nearly 
five hundred years. After nearly four decades of war, the Byzantines had routed the 
Bulgarians in the Balkans and dictated terms to the Saracen powers in the East. It secured 
its preeminence as the West's only superpower and was in position to effect the 
Byzantine epoch. Forty-six years later, however, the empire suffered such a defeat that it 
never truly recovered as a great power. What had happened between 1025 and the Battle 
of Manzikert in 1071? Above all else, the politicians and intellectuals in Constantinople 
became indifferent to the exigencies of strategy. 12 
One may. find refuge from the prospect ofa downfallen United States in the 
argument that American strategy, particularly after 1945, has been effective when and 
where it mattered. Regardless of the strategic challenge; the United States found ways to 
get the job done. One also might find refuge in the prophetic statements of those 
undaunted by the idea that pride goes before a fall. As Joseph Nye and William Owens 
noted: 
12 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and StratecraJt for the Next Century (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 79. 
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The premature end of what Time magazine founder Henry Lane termed the 
American century has been declared more than once by disciples of 
decline. In truth, the 21 st century, not the twentieth, will tum out to be the 
period of America's greatest preeminence. Information is the new coin of 
the international realm, and the United States is better positioned than any 
other country to multiply the potency of its hard and soft power 
resources through information. 13 
While the twenty-first century may well tum out as Nye and Owens envision, 
one might remember that on the eve of its catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Seljuk 
Turks in 1071, Constantinople possessed not only a geography, a strong navy, and a 
fortification system that rendered it highly insular, a subtlety in statecraft and strategy 
surpassed only by the Venetian, Spanish, and British empires, but also an unlimited 
technical hubris borne from the "Greek fire"14-a revolutionary weapon system rival.ed in 
the historical record only by the atomic bomb in its ability to shift a strategic calculus. 
Without fundamental changes in the international system, strategy-like war-will 
remain an inescapable reality oflife in a Hobbesian world. Strategy is a matter of vital 
importance to the state. It lies in the province of life or death. It lies in the realm of 
national survival or ruin. 
I3 Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 
(March/April 1996): 35. 
14 As Gray noted: "Greek fire, a secret weapon ofthe imperial Byzantine navy (probably invented 
by a Syrian architect, Callinicus), played a critical, and possibly even a literalIy decisive, role in the defeat 
of the two great Arab sieges of Constantinople in 673-77 and 717-18. The "fire" was a highly combustible 
mixture of phosphorus and saltpeter which could be discharged from bronze tubes on board ship or 
delivered by projectile. It could not be extinguished by water. Given the immense strength of 
Constantinople's landward defenses, the indifferent skills of the Arabs as siege engineers, and the 
geographical position of the city (roughly a triangle with a landward base and two sea-facing sides), the 
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significance of a weapon like Greek fire which denied the besiegers the ability to enforce a maritime 
blockade or press an assault from the sea can hardly be exaggerated." Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, 376. 
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